Kant on Happiness and Morality: Are They Different?

In Kant’s discussion of metaphysics, he argues that, as reason determines a man’s will, he acts on his will only according to what he recognizes as “being practically necessary, i.e., as good” (412). So, man strives for what he thinks is good and necessary. When he acts according to purely objective principles, he acts according to commands of reason called imperatives (413). These objective principles are universal, and therefore not subjective to circumstance or individual experience. Kant also outlines two kinds of imperatives: hypothetical and categorical. A hypothetical imperative means that an action is necessary as a means to some end, while a categorical imperative means that an action is necessary in and of itself (415). He states that there is one universal end necessitating hypothetical imperatives that all rational beings strive for: happiness (415). Similarly there is one categorical imperative which applies to all rational beings: morality (416).

Thus Kant creates a clear distinction between happiness and morality. Both are objective means, and as all rational beings strive for each, both are grounded firmly in reason. Yet, they are not identical, as one is a means and one is an end. Thus one’s action can be qualified as good either because happiness is the end of this action or because the action is morally good.

In this sense, it seems that Kant makes a fairly substantial break from Aristotle. Aristotle argued that morality (i.e. virtue) is good as it brings about happiness, and happiness is good as the end of virtue. Happiness and complete virtue seem to be one in the same and both good by the same intrinsic principle, as one cannot be happy without virtue and one is happy if he is virtuous. Kant, on the other hand, makes happiness and morality separate products of reason. Any action towards happiness is justified solely by this end, while any moral action is justified solely in and of itself. Kant states that morality is the “one imperative which immediately commands a certain conduct without having as its condition any other purpose to be attained by it” (416). Thus, if our actions are truly moral, there need not be any purpose or end; we act according to this imperative not because of what it attains but because it is good.

In light of Kant’s argument I pose my question thusly: Does Kant’s definition of morality as intrinsically good without having an end hold up, or must all moral actions have an end such as happiness, as Aristotle suggests? In other words, is Kant correct in separating happiness and morality?

Eudaimonia According to Aristotle

As previously discussed in class, eudaimonia is simply the Greek word for 'happiness.' In book 10, chapters 6 through 9, of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, happiness and it's role in life is a common theme. It is discussed in terms of conditions, theoretical study, and virtues. The way Aristotle viewed the world, happiness was an essential part of life. Not only was it "the end," but also the key to leading a virtuous life (Nicomachean 163).

Chapters 7 and 8 deal with conditions for happiness, theoretical study, and virtue, all of which are interdependent on one another. For example, Aristotle defines complete happiness "in accord with its proper virtue," which is the activity of study (Nicomachean 163). For the activity of study is supreme and leads to knowledge and understanding. Aristotle believes that rational contemplation provides a sound basis for determining what is and is not virtuous and based on such contemplation and understanding, people achieve happiness. It is the people that achieve such a state that will, in turn, be the happiest. In other words, "the wise person, more than anyone else, will be happy" (Nicomachean 167).

Examining today's society, it is questionable whether or not knowledge and happiness go hand in hand. Sure, knowledge and education in the United States lead to a what we hope will be a successful and "good" lifestyle, but what about the knowledge of what is going on throughout the world? The knowledge of the disaster in Haiti and of their horrific infrastructure surely shows that each Hatian is not living a good, successful life. And if we are aware of such an issue shouldn't we help change that, not by simply donating money, but by educating the people of Haiti and giving them the help and resources they need to rebuild? Granted, Aristotle believes that external goods do not purely cause happiness, but he does say "...no one can be blessedly happy without external goods..." (Nicomachean 166). So shouldn't we, being the greater of two nations, help give Hatians the external goods needed to live good, successful lives?

On the other hand, however, one may argue that knowledge and happiness do go hand in hand in contemporary society. Knowledge can be defined as knowing the purpose or meaning of one's life and cultivating the world around him or her accordingly.

So which is it, Aristotle, knowledge within our own little world or knowledge of the entire world that eventually leads to the "end"?

Pursuit of Happiness

The first twelve chapters in Book I of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics explore the existence and essence of happiness, what the Greeks call “eudaimonia”. Although the idea of happiness still remains a little elusive to me, I can say for sure that, like our modern ideas of happiness, Aristotle’s thoughts on it carry an implication of success and fulfillment (Nicomachaen 8). Moreover, he believes that people can live in the best way by taking note of other living organisms (i.e. plants and animals), and subscribing solely to what can be described as our human nature, which he believes is acting in “accord with virtue” (Nicomachaen 12).

In the fifth chapter entitled “The Three Lives”, Aristotle begins by discussing how people come to conclusions about what goodness, or happiness actually is. According to him, our understanding of happiness is directly related to our ways of living, which he divides into the three archetypes. Each of the three archetypes, and their consequent interpretations of happiness he says are wrong. I won’t go into the specifics, but I was intrigued by the idea that the common human is unable to grasp what it is to be happy.

I suppose my fascination with that thought is largely because our culture tells us happiness is a subjective feeling. For example, we can possibly imagine a man with no home or possessions leading a life of happiness. I think Aristotle would say a man with no possessions cannot possibly be happy because a “happy person lives well and does well” (Nicomachean 10). Happiness, according to Aristotle, is entirely objective.

But, I digress, as the fate of a homeless man isn’t the best example of a common way of life. No, Aristotle contemplates the lives of politicians and scholars, leaders of society, people you and I would easily consider intelligent enough to comprehend happiness. In these cases, their inability to know happiness is clearly not a question of activity like the homeless man, but once again the notion of virtue. Now, I won’t pretend to completely understand virtue in context of Aristotle’s entire theory on virtue ethics, but from what I do understand virtue is a sort of natural tendency or inclination toward ‘the good’ (Nicomachean 11).

So, if Aristotle stood before me and I said, “You mean to tell me the common person can’t fathom happiness because the common person isn’t naturally ‘good’”. I think his answer would be yes. And, although it seems kind of pessimistic, in context of his logic I see where he’s coming from. We can’t logically assume people are virtuously inclined. True virtue, much like wisdom and intellect, is learned. The best of us can only hope to achieve it. When you think about it, that thought isn’t so different from what we think of happiness today.

Then, if virtuous activity is obtained over time and isn’t assured, is it possible that most people won’t live lives of happiness?