Pursuit of Happiness

The first twelve chapters in Book I of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics explore the existence and essence of happiness, what the Greeks call “eudaimonia”. Although the idea of happiness still remains a little elusive to me, I can say for sure that, like our modern ideas of happiness, Aristotle’s thoughts on it carry an implication of success and fulfillment (Nicomachaen 8). Moreover, he believes that people can live in the best way by taking note of other living organisms (i.e. plants and animals), and subscribing solely to what can be described as our human nature, which he believes is acting in “accord with virtue” (Nicomachaen 12).

In the fifth chapter entitled “The Three Lives”, Aristotle begins by discussing how people come to conclusions about what goodness, or happiness actually is. According to him, our understanding of happiness is directly related to our ways of living, which he divides into the three archetypes. Each of the three archetypes, and their consequent interpretations of happiness he says are wrong. I won’t go into the specifics, but I was intrigued by the idea that the common human is unable to grasp what it is to be happy.

I suppose my fascination with that thought is largely because our culture tells us happiness is a subjective feeling. For example, we can possibly imagine a man with no home or possessions leading a life of happiness. I think Aristotle would say a man with no possessions cannot possibly be happy because a “happy person lives well and does well” (Nicomachean 10). Happiness, according to Aristotle, is entirely objective.

But, I digress, as the fate of a homeless man isn’t the best example of a common way of life. No, Aristotle contemplates the lives of politicians and scholars, leaders of society, people you and I would easily consider intelligent enough to comprehend happiness. In these cases, their inability to know happiness is clearly not a question of activity like the homeless man, but once again the notion of virtue. Now, I won’t pretend to completely understand virtue in context of Aristotle’s entire theory on virtue ethics, but from what I do understand virtue is a sort of natural tendency or inclination toward ‘the good’ (Nicomachean 11).

So, if Aristotle stood before me and I said, “You mean to tell me the common person can’t fathom happiness because the common person isn’t naturally ‘good’”. I think his answer would be yes. And, although it seems kind of pessimistic, in context of his logic I see where he’s coming from. We can’t logically assume people are virtuously inclined. True virtue, much like wisdom and intellect, is learned. The best of us can only hope to achieve it. When you think about it, that thought isn’t so different from what we think of happiness today.

Then, if virtuous activity is obtained over time and isn’t assured, is it possible that most people won’t live lives of happiness?