Kant on Happiness and Morality: Are They Different?

In Kant’s discussion of metaphysics, he argues that, as reason determines a man’s will, he acts on his will only according to what he recognizes as “being practically necessary, i.e., as good” (412). So, man strives for what he thinks is good and necessary. When he acts according to purely objective principles, he acts according to commands of reason called imperatives (413). These objective principles are universal, and therefore not subjective to circumstance or individual experience. Kant also outlines two kinds of imperatives: hypothetical and categorical. A hypothetical imperative means that an action is necessary as a means to some end, while a categorical imperative means that an action is necessary in and of itself (415). He states that there is one universal end necessitating hypothetical imperatives that all rational beings strive for: happiness (415). Similarly there is one categorical imperative which applies to all rational beings: morality (416).

Thus Kant creates a clear distinction between happiness and morality. Both are objective means, and as all rational beings strive for each, both are grounded firmly in reason. Yet, they are not identical, as one is a means and one is an end. Thus one’s action can be qualified as good either because happiness is the end of this action or because the action is morally good.

In this sense, it seems that Kant makes a fairly substantial break from Aristotle. Aristotle argued that morality (i.e. virtue) is good as it brings about happiness, and happiness is good as the end of virtue. Happiness and complete virtue seem to be one in the same and both good by the same intrinsic principle, as one cannot be happy without virtue and one is happy if he is virtuous. Kant, on the other hand, makes happiness and morality separate products of reason. Any action towards happiness is justified solely by this end, while any moral action is justified solely in and of itself. Kant states that morality is the “one imperative which immediately commands a certain conduct without having as its condition any other purpose to be attained by it” (416). Thus, if our actions are truly moral, there need not be any purpose or end; we act according to this imperative not because of what it attains but because it is good.

In light of Kant’s argument I pose my question thusly: Does Kant’s definition of morality as intrinsically good without having an end hold up, or must all moral actions have an end such as happiness, as Aristotle suggests? In other words, is Kant correct in separating happiness and morality?