Kant begins by defining his particular meaning of love and respect in regards to both always being combined as one duty according with the law (Metaphysics 448) that we, as rational beings, would legislate upon ourselves. Both are abstracted from any kind of sentimental connotation, and are instead instilled with a sense of practicality.
The duty of free respect to others entailed a negative law of duty. As such, we are free, as intelligent beings to not “exalt oneself above others” (449). Respect is thus a maxim that places intelligent, moral constraints on ones self esteem to prevent him from stepping on the dignity of another person (449). It keeps each person in obligation to himself, within his own bounds (450), and in a sense repulsed from another (449).
So what exactly provides for one person to be attracted to another? As a moral community surely cannot be comprised of people whom have nothing to bind them together; each member must not only keep from trampling on someone else’s dignity, but should actually treat that person as an end in himself rather than a subsequent means to one’s own end. This is precisely where the positive, practical aspect of love within duty makes itself crucial (450).
“The duty to love one’s neighbor can also be expressed as the duty to make the [moral] ends of others my own” (450). In other words, Kant attributes love in this moral-maxim sense insofar as it is accompanied in its definition by respect. Respect is included with love as love points out the necessity of obligating only oneself toward another in a respectful, necessary fashion and within one’s “own bounds” (450). As an obligation toward another person, here we are able to identify the positive practical attribute of duty in love.
I understand the fact that Kant is trying to classify aspects of morality in a generalized manner; however, I find myself rejecting the absoluteness with which he puts forth his claims. When speaking about love and stating that we (I) must keep within “my own bounds” (450), how exactly would these “bounds” be able to be identified cross-culturally as a single, absolute way of one’s obligatory actions in relation to another person? For surely there are norms in some countries that people from a different country would find peculiar, or in the worst-case-scenario, completely disrespectful. For instance, a married woman from Saudi Arabia is required to get her “husband's permission to depart the country, while unmarried women and children require the permission of their father or male guardian” (Saudi Arabia). Many people whom have grown up in the US would likely be very shocked by this treatment of an adult female; nevertheless, with the religious and cultural background of Saudi Arabia, nothing else could be considered more normal in terms of the obligations people have toward one another in that particular country.
So my concern rests in how exactly Kant would be able to explain his way out of such a drastic cultural disparity in terms of moral obligations one person would feel they have toward another. It seems to me that he claims the possibility of an absolute sense of what is moral and what is not. But surely, many unmarried 30-year-old women in the US do not feel morally obliged to ask their fathers’ permission to travel out of the country, thus undermining any applicable absolute rule common to both cultures.
Kant may answer my apprehension toward accepting such an unconditional claim with the use of this example by saying that, A) it has nothing to do with “depriving another of any of the value which he has as a human being” (450), or B) that ways of acting morally toward one another may, indeed, differ with regards to cultural background.
In response to A, I would claim that a relativistic example such as this does have a great deal to do with - in the mindset of the Saudi Arabian culture in the strict sense – the value one would feel in their human dignity, in the sense that if an unmarried woman did not ask her father’s permission (for instance, if she didn’t have the time to), she would most likely feel a negative affect within her own self-value, and her father would probably feel offended in his own person and depraved of fruitful emotional value in some sense. Thus, such a simple cultural norm that differs so drastically from ours can indeed affect the sense of value in at least one person involved. But how exactly would Kant explain this cultural phenomenon of difference in what would affect one’s sense of value? I see nowhere his mentioning anything with reference to the relativity between cultures, religions, or norms. This would be my reply to answer B, as these varieties in what different peoples of this world consider “normal” ways of conducting themselves is not even recognized in his writings. Without explicitly acknowledging culturally-based variation between peoples, I can only assume the absoluteness of his considerations, with which I cannot agree.
"Saudi Arabia." Welcome to Travel.State.Gov. U.S. State Department, 26 May 2009. Web. 31 Mar. 2010. http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1012.html.
7 comments:
I find your examples of love and obligation in different cultures to be very intriguing and interesting, but I do not think that Kant is really commenting on differences in culture around the world. I think the main point is, as you say, that we show a certain obligation to one another, which is in turn a sign of love and respect to other individuals. Although it is true that Americans would find the ways in which Saudi men show their love to their wives, or women in general, to be "different" from our own culture, I don't think that we can deny that these men "love" their wives. In the many different Arabic cultures, wearing clothing that distinguishes themselves from other women around the world may be, in some way, a form of their own identity. There are those women that say that they feel degraded by covering themselves in this culture, but there are also those that believe that it is their duty to do so, and to them it is a sign of love and respect to their husbands.
I do believe that your question on whether or not Kant's arguments are applicable to all types of societies and cultures is quite valid. However I think the main thing to remember is that these absolute duties are primarily determined by reason and, as reasonable individuals, we are urged to understand each other in our own context and in our own right. Saudi Arabian culture and it's civilian participants, though completely different from American culture, would be respected insofar as it is the product of rational human beings that can reason. As such, we must know that though the ways humans can love and respect one another are varied the concept there is an underlying generality that can be applied to all individuals: Love and respect is the duty of human kind, insofar as we treat others like they are rational beings, generally capable of legislating to themselves. However, overall your question is very interesting and would like to here what Kant would have to say about it.
In response to the first comment, I did not say that Kant comments on the differences around the world. On the contrary, I am saying that he fails to account for any types of differences, insofar that he acknowledges none.
As an absolutist, Kant pushes forth a universal, unconditional ground (reason) by which all moral laws are established. And indeed, one of these seems to be, as we have both conveyed, "a certain obligation toward one another". However, my point is that Kant is not able to - or has not explicitly stated - exactly what would account for the variety of what would be considered an appropriate "obligation" from one culture to the next. For if all humans have the same a priori reason, then all people around the world would rationally come to the same conclusions of exactly what kind of obligations they would have toward another (these obligations would include both emotions [love] and actually physical treatment [how a man shows his love for his wife]).
My initial response above touched slightly upon my response to the second comment, in that indeed, as you say, Kant's notion of absolute duties are determined by reason. But how, then, would we be able to account for different "contexts"? Surely all humans have the same type of reason. And if this single type of reason determines the ways in which we think we should act, then all humans would think it appropriate to act in a united manner, thus making all contexts the same. But this is not the case. Even with notions like "love" and "respect", people's ideas about these concepts differ between societies (if they even have such a concept). And this was precisely my problem with Kant's writing in the first place, so it seems as if we are both aware of it. He does not provide grounds for the core differences of morality between differing cultures.
I think that you are right to question the absolutist nature of Kant’s philosophy. However, it seems that in the context of love and respect this absolutist theme is not indisputably apparent. You note that the practices in Saudi Arabia that the western world might view with disdain are seen as normal obligations within the country. While Kant notes that our duties of love and respect necessitate certain obligations, he does not specify these obligations beyond the broad terms “beneficence”, “gratitude”, and “sympathy” (452). While the Saudi Arabian view may be different from ours, it nevertheless justifies certain practices within these guidelines as far as Saudis are concerned. So, within the context of love and respect, Kant does not necessarily discredit some of these practices which might otherwise seem immoral.
I think you raise an interesting question about how Kant would/could explain the differences in values cross-culturally, specifically with the example of the obligations of women in the United States opposed to women in Saudi Arabia. I personally felt like Kant also was somewhat "absolutist" in his theories. But after reading the Nagel article "Ethics," I feel like this is an over-simplified view of Kant. As a background, Nagel emphasizes that human morality needs to be more objective, although this objectivity often stems from subjective material, which normally will confuse matters. He alleges that our understanding of ethics is at best primitive as "even the most civilized human beings have only a haphazard understanding of how to live, how to treat others, how to organize their societies" (Nagel 186). Taking a step further, Nagel acknowledges that "There can be no ethics without politics" (Nagel 188). The theory of how individuals should act requires an institution to regulate such a theory. This relates specifically to the differences between Saudi Arabia and the United States. Both countries are governed by different political bodies based on a contrasting cultural atmosphere. Therefore, our two countries will most likely not share the same values/morals within each physical location. I’m not sure if this totally makes Kant absolutist, because I feel like he would assume that our ethics are closely linked with our politics. Aristotle laid the groundwork for this method of thinking by correlating his philosophy with the values of Athens. Even though Kant may not have felt as strongly, I feel like he could anticipate this argument on account of the theories of philosophers before him. Thus, I think in regards to this question, it’s important not to forget that the actualization of moral theory comes forth mainly in politics.
This is an interesting discussion, and I find myself somewhere between all of your opinions, I think. I would agree that Kant provides objective qualifications for love and respect of other human beings (in that love is placing the ends of others as your own, and respect is not exalting yourself above others), but I would say that this does not make Kant absolutist, in for instnace the sense that all women can or cannot wear burkas, etc. I say this because it seems reasonable that a woman could willfully make the choice to wear a burka due to reasons of love and respect, which would be moral to Kant. But it does seem less likely to be reasonable that someone, her husband, for instance, could morally force her to wear the burka, because this would most likely violate the respect clause of not placing others below or inferior to oneself. However, if both the husband's and wife's beliefs lead them to believe they are acting out of love and respect, as defined above, then it would seem that they could both be acting morally; therefore, I would have to say that Kant's views allow for differences in culture in so much as the a priori conditions, of love and respect, are fed through ones own beliefs (i.e. what constitutes an "end" of others and what can be considered not exalting yourself above others).
Wow, insightful post, Dominique.
Kant's moral universalism does seem to bring up a lot of issues when we try to apply it globally. One way to respond to these possible ethical criticisms is that universality is not necessarily uniformity. We can have a variety of cultures and societies applying some fundamental principles, so long as these basic principles can be universalized without contradiction. For your example, the Saudi values/traditions/religious practices which concern the rights, expectations, and roles of women are not inherently contradictory or inconsistent with Kant’s formulations of the categorical imperative. The C.I. is, after all, concerned fundamentally with autonomy and universality—the coexistence of interpretations (for lack of a better term) does not reduce its validity.
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