
Kant begins by defining his particular meaning of love and respect in regards to both always being combined as one duty according with the law (Metaphysics 448) that we, as rational beings, would legislate upon ourselves. Both are abstracted from any kind of sentimental connotation, and are instead instilled with a sense of practicality.
The duty of free respect to others entailed a negative law of duty. As such, we are free, as intelligent beings to not “exalt oneself above others” (449). Respect is thus a maxim that places intelligent, moral constraints on ones self esteem to prevent him from stepping on the dignity of another person (449). It keeps each person in obligation to himself, within his own bounds (450), and in a sense repulsed from another (449).
So what exactly provides for one person to be attracted to another? As a moral community surely cannot be comprised of people whom have nothing to bind them together; each member must not only keep from trampling on someone else’s dignity, but should actually treat that person as an end in himself rather than a subsequent means to one’s own end. This is precisely where the positive, practical aspect of love within duty makes itself crucial (450).
“The duty to love one’s neighbor can also be expressed as the duty to make the [moral] ends of others my own” (450). In other words, Kant attributes love in this moral-maxim sense insofar as it is accompanied in its definition by respect. Respect is included with love as love points out the necessity of obligating only oneself toward another in a respectful, necessary fashion and within one’s “own bounds” (450). As an obligation toward another person, here we are able to identify the positive practical attribute of duty in love.
I understand the fact that Kant is trying to classify aspects of morality in a generalized manner; however, I find myself rejecting the absoluteness with which he puts forth his claims. When speaking about love and stating that we (I) must keep within “my own bounds” (450), how exactly would these “bounds” be able to be identified cross-culturally as a single, absolute way of one’s obligatory actions in relation to another person? For surely there are norms in some countries that people from a different country would find peculiar, or in the worst-case-scenario, completely disrespectful. For instance, a married woman from Saudi Arabia is required to get her “husband's permission to depart the country, while unmarried women and children require the permission of their father or male guardian” (Saudi Arabia). Many people whom have grown up in the US would likely be very shocked by this treatment of an adult female; nevertheless, with the religious and cultural background of Saudi Arabia, nothing else could be considered more normal in terms of the obligations people have toward one another in that particular country.
So my concern rests in how exactly Kant would be able to explain his way out of such a drastic cultural disparity in terms of moral obligations one person would feel they have toward another. It seems to me that he claims the possibility of an absolute sense of what is moral and what is not. But surely, many unmarried 30-year-old women in the US do not feel morally obliged to ask their fathers’ permission to travel out of the country, thus undermining any applicable absolute rule common to both cultures.
Kant may answer my apprehension toward accepting such an unconditional claim with the use of this example by saying that, A) it has nothing to do with “depriving another of any of the value which he has as a human being” (450), or B) that ways of acting morally toward one another may, indeed, differ with regards to cultural background.
In response to A, I would claim that a relativistic example such as this does have a great deal to do with - in the mindset of the Saudi Arabian culture in the strict sense – the value one would feel in their human dignity, in the sense that if an unmarried woman did not ask her father’s permission (for instance, if she didn’t have the time to), she would most likely feel a negative affect within her own self-value, and her father would probably feel offended in his own person and depraved of fruitful emotional value in some sense. Thus, such a simple cultural norm that differs so drastically from ours can indeed affect the sense of value in at least one person involved. But how exactly would Kant explain this cultural phenomenon of difference in what would affect one’s sense of value? I see nowhere his mentioning anything with reference to the relativity between cultures, religions, or norms. This would be my reply to answer B, as these varieties in what different peoples of this world consider “normal” ways of conducting themselves is not even recognized in his writings. Without explicitly acknowledging culturally-based variation between peoples, I can only assume the absoluteness of his considerations, with which I cannot agree.
"Saudi Arabia." Welcome to Travel.State.Gov. U.S. State Department, 26 May 2009. Web. 31 Mar. 2010. http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1012.html.