Justice and Utility

Mill believes that utilitarianism to become a real way of life it is necessary to define justice within this main idea. Therefore, Mill begins to define justice first through defining what is unjust. He defines the unjust actions through five different main ideas, it is unjust to: deprive someone of their legal rights, depriving someone of something they have a moral right to possess, obtaining something that they do not morally deserve, violating an agreement with someone else, and showing favoritism to someone under inappropriate circumstances (Mill 44-45). Mill defines injustice to allow us to understand justice better.

After explaining what is unjust, Mill follows the idea of justice through history. By speaking of how each of the different ancient cultures understood justice, Mill believes that he will eventually reach what the definition of justice is. The groups most examined by Mill are the Greeks and Romans. These ancient peoples eventually recognized that although their idea of justice was simply following the law that because, “their laws had been made originally, and continued to be made, by men,” it was entirely possible that there were bad laws that had been made (47). Because of these bad laws it may become necessary to break them in certain situations. This idea of justice was also followed by Mill through Christianity; one of Christian’s main sources of law comes from the Ten Commandments which explicitly states that one should not lie. However, going back to a situation Kant used, if a life is endanger through the utilitarian idea of finding the greatest good for the whole community one should at least mislead the person because it is important to keep the good of all people in mind, because to keep a life will most likely help a community more than losing a life.

Through his examination of past cultures, Mill comes to the conclusion that the justice in its lowest form is following the law and being punished for breaking those laws. However, as he continues to write, Mill decides that justice is different for each and every person because the definition of utility for each person changes. In the end, justice seemingly coincides with the idea that every person being an individual must simply hope that they can work for the same ultimate goal of a communal happiness which would allow for justice to be found within the entire community.

Mill’s understanding of justice is so drastically different from both Kant and Aristotle, is it possible that each person must find their own, individual definition of justice, but that this definition must be in harmony with others in the community? Or do Kant and Aristotle’s definitions work better because they allow for a more rigid understanding thereby allowing everyone to have the same definition? In the end, I believe that each individual should find his or her own definition but still have a clear idea of justice in society also.

Mill's Defense of the Doctrine of Utilitarianism & its Relationship to Virtue

In J.S. Mill’s Utilitarianism, Mill alleges in Chapter IV “Of What Sort of Proof the Principle of Utility is Susceptible” that the first principles are not capable of proof by reasoning. He reiterates this basis initially introduced in Chapter II, but goes a step further in his explanation of the utilitarian doctrine as “that happiness is desirable, and that the only thing desirable, as an end; all other things being only desirable as means to that end” (Mill 35). The remainder of his argument arguably justifies this statement. Because we cannot ascertain this principle through reason, Mill argues that we know it through experience. Mill maintains the position that “No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness” (Mill 35). At first, this appears to be a very immature and unfounded argument (“I’m right because I know I’m right”) that does little to address objections to the doctrine of utility. But upon further investigation, Mill proves that the desire of things other than happiness can be decidedly distinguished from the sole desire of happiness. Mill explains that “Happiness is not an abstract idea but a concrete whole” consisting of many separate parts (Mill 38). These parts range from the love of music or the desire for health to the love of money. According to the utilitarian doctrine, virtue is not a universal but it is just as authentic as the desire for happiness. So for those who desire virtue, they do so not as “a means to happiness, but as a part of their happiness” (Mill 37). Therefore, virtue seems almost as an optional component to happiness. Unlike Aristotle, Mill does not believe that the perfection of a virtuous character will lead to the ultimate end of happiness. He acquiesces that although it may be a part of one’s happiness, the desire for the attainment of virtue is not a road map to happiness.
Returning to Mill’s initial question about what sort of proof this principle is susceptible to, he answers that “if human nature is so constituted as to desire nothing which is not either a part of happiness or a means of happiness – we can have no other proof, and we require no other, that these are the only things desirable” (Mill 39). Mill argues that since all human beings desire the same thing – happiness (whether directly or indirectly, in some way or another) than there can exist no opposition to this argument and he does not require a proof to prove his point. Is this true? Do we truly need no logical or rational proof to justify the pursuit of happiness? Also, how can virtue be optional to happiness according to the doctrine of utilitarianism, if this same doctrine requires one to promote the greatest happiness of others? Can one help promote another’s happiness without a virtuous character? Or does the pursuit of a virtuous character (according to Aristotle or other philosophers) obstruct or blur the achievement of happiness?

"Reasons We Can Share"

Philosophers have defined primal morality as an act done for or to someone else. Christine Korsgaard argues that morality revolves around people doing something together. “The subject of morality is not what we should bring about, but how we relate to one another” (Korsgaard 275). The question is whether reasons and values are subjective, existing only in relation to individuals, or objective, there for everyone?

Subjective reasons are actions done for one self, for example, promoting your own happiness. Subjective reasons are declared “good-for”. Objective reasons are actions done for anyone, for example, promoting the happiness of yourself and some one else. This is considered “good-absolutely”. There is a second interpretation of “good-absolutely” that has an intrinsic value, meaning that it provides a reason for both people to act for one another.

In “Reasons We Can Share” Korsgaard makes the claim that reasons and values are objective. She argues against Thomas Nagel who believes reasons and values are subjective. Nagel posits that all subjective reasons must be taken in order to have objective correlates. “If it is good for me to have something, then we must regard it as good-absolutely that I should have it” (Nagel 277). To counter this argument Korsgaard gives the example of someone being bullied. According to Nagel’s argument the person who is being bullied resents the action and because he resents it then the bully should as well. But Korsgaard argues that the person who is being a bully should know not to bully people because he would not like it done to him. Korsgaard applies relational concepts (objective) while Nagel proposes individual concepts (subjective). Nagel says that in order for us to relate with other people we must find an understanding in ourselves while Korsgaard says that we can act morally to other people because we know they exist.

Nagel re-claims his statement and states that some actions are purely subjective neutral and that objective reasons are not necessary in these actions. Nagel gives the example of climbing a mountain; stating that the action of climbing will only bring happiness to one person. Korsgaard counters his argument by stating that Nagel’s example can be defined as an ambition. Furthermore, ambitions are put in place because people have already put an objective realist interpretation. She gives the example of viewing a painting or eating chocolate. Someone who eats chocolate likes it and someone who does not can potentially be missing out on some sort of value. But these values where already put in place by the masses not by an individual, thus stating that individuals react in an objective manner rather than subjective.

Korsgaard main point; “to say you have a reason is to say something relational, something which implies the existence of another, at least another self” (Korsgaard 301).
Moreover, normative claims are claims that we make on ourselves and with each other. Thus, Korsgaard disproves Nagel by claiming that acknowledging another person is not a reason to treat someone in a certain way but “rather something that stands behind the very possibility of reasons” (Korsgaard 301).

I agree that can not exert claims on others without realizing that other people exist. I also agree that the world is a relational and interdependent place. One can not exist by him or herself. I feel that Korsgaard’s point has human character taken into account while Nagel’s point claims that individuals act out of purely individualistic which is not a reality.

All for One and None for All

According to Sedgwick, Egoistic Hedonism is the most “despicable and base” (Methods of Ethics 413) of the three methods of Ethics as, by definition, it affirms that each individual should aim to promote his/her own happiness. This however appears to be less about instinctive principle and more about social construction. Sedgwick than proceeds to persuade a fantastic Egoist in adopting universalist ideas, conclusively affirming the only means of successively proving the first principle of Utilitarianism to a true Egoist is to assert a general sanction that his happiness is ultimately dependent on the happiness of others (Method of Ethics 416).

While this author has no issue with the above conclusion, Sedgwick ruins an otherwise justifiable proof by furthering this argument with an actual hypothetical discussion to convince the Egoist to accept Universalist doctrine. Sedgwick writes:

“When the Egoist puts forward…the proposition that his happiness or pleasure is Good, not only for him but from the point of view of the universe…by saying ‘nature designed him to seek his own happiness,’ It then becomes relevant to point out to him that that his happiness cannot be a more important part of good than the equal happiness of any other person. And thus…may be brought to accept universal happiness or pleasure… (Methods of Ethics 416-417)”

While the first part of Sedgwick’s conclusive statement makes much sense as it is sensible to assume that convincing an egoist to adopt altruistic dogmas is to cater to his/her self-centered ideals, the example discussion makes no sense as a true Egoist would simply say “says who?”The Egoist would not be persuaded by a simple reiteration of the primary difference between Egoists and Universalists, regardless of the latter’s use of the formers own principle. While I believe it is true that as humans we are naturally prone to avoid pain and enjoy personal pleasures, I do not believe that these pleasures should be enjoyed at the expense of others. However an Egoistic has no concerns for the welfare or general happiness of others; only insofar the welfare and happiness of the other concerns those of the the Egoist. Because of this, the above scenario would not work as the Egoist will not care about whether the overall populace is happy or not or whether his happiness is the most important part of good or not. Perhaps the Universalist could have just said that, naturally speaking, if the many are happy they are more likely to tend to the happiness of the one. Otherwise, How could we convince such a self-absorbed body that Utilitarianism is all about the collective happiness?

The Real Deal This Time

For Kant, virtue is practical reason's highest unconditional end. Virtue is it own end and, "because of the merit which men accord it, is also its own reward"(Metaphysics 396). Indeed, Kant says that man has obligation to be virtuous. The duties of virtue for Kant read as such; (1) my own end, which is at the same time my duty, (2) the end of others, whose promotion is at the same time my duty, i.e. the happiness of others, (3) the law which is at the same time an incentive, on which the morality of every free determination of the will rests, and (4). the end which is at the same time an incentive, on which the legality of every free determination of the will rests(Metaphysics 398). These qualities of moral feeling, conscience, love of one's neighbor, and respect for yourself lie in everyone and are the natural predispositions that lead us to a concept of duty.

Moral feeling is the pleasure or displeasure that comes from the conscious as to whether or not one's actions is with the law of duty(399). Moral feeling is cultivated by recognizing that the strongest excitement comes from following reason. We don't have a sense for moral good or evil only a free choice influenced by pure reason.

Kant describes conscience as, "practical reason, holding up before a man his duty for acquittal or condemnation case under a law"(Metaphysics 400). As with all four of these, they exist in all of us. So the phrase that one has no conscious only means that one will not had their conscious. The only duty concerned with conscious is to cultivate it.

Love or a lack thereof doesn't concern duty for Kant, since benevolence can be subject to a law of duty, and is therefore is neccesary regardless of love(401). We can also not have a duty for respect, since this would be like having an obligation to have a duty. Respect is necessary for one to understand duty.

Kant goes onto propose three maxims of the scientific treatment of a doctrine of virue to oppose the old ones. These new ones are: (1) a duty can only have a single ground of obligation, (2) the difference between virtue and vice only concern the specific qualities of the maxim, and (3). ethical duties must be estimated in accordance with the law(Metaphysics 404).

Overall virtue is our moral strength of the will of us in obeying duty(Metaphysics 405). Virtue posses us since if we owned it then we could discard it, and need a virtue to make that choice. Internal freedom is the condition of every duty of virtue, with two things being required for internal freedom; master of oneself in a given case, and to be able to govern ones emotions and passions(Metaphysics 407). Emotions proceed reflection, while passion tends to be worse since one reflect and commits the action anyway. There are three principles for the division of the doctrine of virtue: no external legislation can exist for them, the law of duty is for the maxim of actions, and ethical duty must be conceived as broad duty(410). It must on top of this be a doctrine of ends, so that we oneself and everyone else as an end.

Kant says that we must subdue our emotions and passions, but one most admit that this is rather difficult. Would not be better, or is it possible to cultivate our emotions and our passions as Kant says we can with our conscious?

How Do We Decide Which Way to Live our Lives?

The question that one really faces here is what do people really believe our duty as a human is? If one acts morally correct that means we are following certain rules or a distinct way of life under restrictions of right and wrong. According to Davis, if one has these beliefs, there has to be some wrong in one self, “thus morally unacceptable,” (Davis, 205). This belief is what is called deontology. This meaning a study of nature of responsibility and obligation, instead of those who are known as teleologists, where right and wrong are determined by the consequences of our actions (Davis, 205). As a deontologist, one is not able to see the difference between what is right and what is good. For one to be moral, one must follow a set of rules as a guide for their way of life. If there are no consequences when something is done wrong, how do we then again determine it is wrong? Opposed to consequentialism, our action leads to a certain result, which is the consequence one receives for their doing. Is it morally correct to only follow these certain constraints that deontologists are supposed to follow? Meaning, deontologists live their lives very carefully because one must always know and be able to judge what is wrong before we even acting upon it. For one to be a follower of deontology one must follow a certain structure, and only that structure. If we fail to do something then we must consciously know we are not acting correctly, and that in the end there is no way to get around doing bad.

Deontology, maintains the wrongness in our actions before a consequence is even determined to result in that action. Davis also goes on to explain deontological constraints are also “narrowly directed.” The consequence does not change from action to action. If one does something deliberately, one must pay the price. “ We are not as responsible for the foreseen consequences of our actions as we are for the things that we intend,” (Davis 209). Does this mean that one is more responsible for the actions that they perform, then they are for the actual consequences that really result from them? For example, if an innocent man was murdered, the idea of killing is wrong, deontologists forget to recognize the consequence of ones action. Killing an innocent man can tear a family apart and cause much grief. If we don’t think about the consequences of our actions that is not morally correct. Shouldn’t we always be aware of what our actions can cause to our environment? Deontologists are enabled to act in a way that may not necessarily be “good”, and that be okay, but for a consequentialist, your actions should always be the best ones, and never be any less. Violating the deontologist structure, means intentionally doing something not morally correct.

Although, one should know what is right and wrong automatically, there shouldn’t be only a set of rules that one must follow to live a moral life. Whether or not you choose to live a deontological or consequential life, shouldn’t we live by both? Yes, we should have laws to follow, but we should also be given a consequence for our actions, good or bad. That is what makes one a better person to learn to live a moral and successful life.

Kant: A True Friend with Respect for Others

Firstly, Kant commences the discourse of this section in explaining the respect that all humans owe to other human beings. He specifically states from the start that, “Every man has a rightful claim of respect from his fellow men, and he is also bound to show respect to every other man in return” (Metaphysics 462). In this specific section, Kant will also go on to say how respect is a moral duty that can be compromised by the characters of pride, slander, and mockery, but are also essential to friendship; friendship, which is also a duty but in a more realistic manner than we have previously seen in Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics.

Kant formally makes the claim that all humans are required to show respect, due to the fact that humans need to maintain the dignity that is existent among humanity (Metaphysics 462), which also shows a sort of worth within our culture. But it is not only the respect of other people that humans must follow; Kant explains that respect for the law is the respect that precedes any other kind of respect. If one respects the law and the universal maxims in society, it is implied that one will also have respect for humanity. As a duty, the respect that one gives to mankind and to the law of the land is described by Kant as the “respectable” and “decent” thing to do (Metaphysics 464). On the other hand, the characteristics of pride, calumny, and mockery are described by Kant as a loss of respect and dignity for humanity (466). Kant specifically states that these characteristics “cast a shadow of worthlessness upon our species…” (466). Therefore, respect is a duty among all humans, which represents our dignity and, in a way, our superiority among all other species that exist on the Earth.

Finally, Kant describes friendship and its relationship with respect in the last discourse of this section. What is more interesting in this section, though, are the differences that can be seen between the arguments of Kant and Aristotle on the matter of friendship. The main difference is Kant’s perception of “reality” in friendship. He maintains the argument that a true friendship, the union of two people, is realistic and may not always be moral, but he agrees with Aristotle in stating that there are no true models of friends amongst us (470). He maintains the realism in his argument in stating that, “it is a burden to feel oneself tied to the destiny of others and laden with alien responsibilities” (470). Therefore, Kant agrees that fights are common among friendships, but what makes a friendship truly moral is the mutual openness between the individuals (471), not that the individuals have to be mirror images of each other as Aristotle believes.

I have come to agree that Kant’s realism within his arguments are more perplexing to the notion of respect in our modern world, but I also have to question his statement that it is an “outrage to inflict punishments” among others (463). Not all humans can follow a morally just life, but that doesn’t mean that they shouldn’t try. Isn’t punishment a method in which we are able to put other humans on the right track to happiness (it does not only have to be physical punishment)? We sometimes use war as a type of punishment; are all types of punishment wrong in the eyes of Kant?