For Kant, virtue is practical reason's highest unconditional end. Virtue is it own end and, "because of the merit which men accord it, is also its own reward"(Metaphysics 396). Indeed, Kant says that man has obligation to be virtuous. The duties of virtue for Kant read as such; (1) my own end, which is at the same time my duty, (2) the end of others, whose promotion is at the same time my duty, i.e. the happiness of others, (3) the law which is at the same time an incentive, on which the morality of every free determination of the will rests, and (4). the end which is at the same time an incentive, on which the legality of every free determination of the will rests(Metaphysics 398). These qualities of moral feeling, conscience, love of one's neighbor, and respect for yourself lie in everyone and are the natural predispositions that lead us to a concept of duty.
Moral feeling is the pleasure or displeasure that comes from the conscious as to whether or not one's actions is with the law of duty(399). Moral feeling is cultivated by recognizing that the strongest excitement comes from following reason. We don't have a sense for moral good or evil only a free choice influenced by pure reason.
Kant describes conscience as, "practical reason, holding up before a man his duty for acquittal or condemnation case under a law"(Metaphysics 400). As with all four of these, they exist in all of us. So the phrase that one has no conscious only means that one will not had their conscious. The only duty concerned with conscious is to cultivate it.
Love or a lack thereof doesn't concern duty for Kant, since benevolence can be subject to a law of duty, and is therefore is neccesary regardless of love(401). We can also not have a duty for respect, since this would be like having an obligation to have a duty. Respect is necessary for one to understand duty.
Kant goes onto propose three maxims of the scientific treatment of a doctrine of virue to oppose the old ones. These new ones are: (1) a duty can only have a single ground of obligation, (2) the difference between virtue and vice only concern the specific qualities of the maxim, and (3). ethical duties must be estimated in accordance with the law(Metaphysics 404).
Overall virtue is our moral strength of the will of us in obeying duty(Metaphysics 405). Virtue posses us since if we owned it then we could discard it, and need a virtue to make that choice. Internal freedom is the condition of every duty of virtue, with two things being required for internal freedom; master of oneself in a given case, and to be able to govern ones emotions and passions(Metaphysics 407). Emotions proceed reflection, while passion tends to be worse since one reflect and commits the action anyway. There are three principles for the division of the doctrine of virtue: no external legislation can exist for them, the law of duty is for the maxim of actions, and ethical duty must be conceived as broad duty(410). It must on top of this be a doctrine of ends, so that we oneself and everyone else as an end.
Kant says that we must subdue our emotions and passions, but one most admit that this is rather difficult. Would not be better, or is it possible to cultivate our emotions and our passions as Kant says we can with our conscious?
Friday, April 9, 2010
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9 comments:
I am confused by the question you pose in the end of your blog. You say it is difficult to subdue our emotions and passions, but, after all, is that not a central part of morality, not just Kant’s ethical system, subduing our irrational impulses in pursuit of the better action? I am not sure what you mean by the second part of your question, but from what I understand, I think we could cultivate our emotions and passions but that does not mean that they must dictate our actions. After all, if everyone acted according to the categorical imperative, we would live in a kingdom of ends where peacefulness and happiness (emotion) would prevail. They would be cultivated separately from reason and as result of morality, not a cause of it.
I agree with Abigail about subduing our passions and emotions. Like she said, self-control is a principle aspect of virtue. In answer to your question about cultivating our emotions and passions, I cannot see how this would be possible while still living according to Kant’s moral standards. Kant notes, “passion is the sensible appetite grown into a lasting inclination”, and thus the mind is able to “take up what is bad… into its maxim” (408). In a sense Kant implies that when one cultivates an emotion, it becomes a passion, and when one gives into a passion he is more likely to give in to vice. In this sense, it seems that self control over one’s feelings is of paramount importance, no matter how difficult it may seem.
In saying that we must cultivate our emotions, I believe that this in a sense is a form of subduing them. While we are not completely burying them, we feel our emotions and should have to the ability to let them influence our actions but in a rational manner. I think there is a difference between irrational impulses and emotions, mainly that impulses are simply action without reason and our emotions are just of feelings and instincts. It is up to the person whether or not they act on these feelings. We must live in accordance with reason but also with emotions or else everyone would simply act the same way.
I agree that the cultivation of emotion rather than its suppression makes more sense and is more realistic. People will never be able to effectively and fully suppress their emotions but they may learn how to channel their emotions so that their reactions are more in accordance with reason. To subdue our emotions is a purely theoretical proposition because it is impossibility and as Kant himself writes, “Yet we cannot but observe with admiration how great an advantage the power of practical judgment has over the theoretical in ordinary human understanding” (404). Kant goes on to state that once something deviates from human experiences, it falls into inconceivabilities, which is exactly what happens with the idea of subduing one’s emotions and passions.
I agree with Kant on the point that obligation or duty is derived from moral feeling, conscious, love, and respect. However I am confused with the statement that “emotion proceeds reflection, while passion tends to be worse…” Isn’t passion also a kind of emotion? I personally believe that it would be great if we could suppress our emotions and let our conscience take full control because that way we wouldn’t have any weaknesses, we could be like “super” people. But because we are human beings it would be impossible for this to ever occur since we were born into and grew up with relationships. These relationships lead to attachments, and attachments leads to emotions.
I am also confused by the question you pose at the end of your blog post. When you say cultivate do you mean develop our emotions through our conscious? If so, I think that no, we cannot consciously develop emotions and make ourselves feel a certain way. However, I do agree with Tim when he says that cultivating our emotions could be a form of subduing them. Rather than making ourselves feel a certain way from nothing, we are able to "cultivate" them by repressing what we do not want to feel. In a way, it is a form of regression; although rather than using the word "cultivate," to show advancement, a word such as "ignore" or "neglect" would better fit. I am curious, Sean, as to what you meant by the question and what your answer might be.
Sean, I think one important point to make is that passions lead you away from a pure/rational moral law and towards corruption.
I'm being imprecise here but: passions allow an individual to conditionalize an action--to do something out of empathy, pity, hunger, or other qualifications. But Kant's entire moral law seems opposed to this; as soon as one strays away from a universalized law (categorical imperative), the action loses moral worth.
I agree with Vlad -- I think Kant believes we shouldn't cultivate our emotions or passions in fear that they will lead us to trangress morality and forget to live by the categorical imperative. To Kant, emotions almost confuse the issue, or the form of an action, because emotions are generally attached to the outcomes of an action. In the example presented in class, if a man with a gun is about to open fire on multiple people and kill them, is it okay to murder this particular individual? Kant advocates for the rational decision that "No" -- Killing is never acceptable no matter what positive benefits might possibly considered from a death. An emotional or passionate response may not agree with such logic, but again this is contrarty to Kant's systematic doctrine of morals.
I agree with Kant that we should subdue or emotions and passions. I think emotions and passions can be seen as pleasurable aspects. It is important to indulge in these pleasures moderately. It’s the same scenario with Aristotle and over indulging in our pleasures. I do not believe we should completely subdue our passions and emotions because they help us lead to our happiness.
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