WAR IS WAR!!!!!

In War and Massacre, Thomas Nagel states that the most common moral issue raised by the handling of warfare is the problem of means and ends (W&M 52). This problem is formed when one goes through the dilemma in which one believes that by taking a certain measure, its gains will outweigh its costs, however because of one’s moral intuition, one then suspects that the initial plan should be abandoned(W&M 52). Take, for example, that by bombing a village where several terrorists were believed to be residing, while this action may prevent more disasters, the lives of hundreds of innocent bystanders will also be obliterated in the process. According to Nagel, this dilemma is produced by the two conflicting categories of moral reason, utilitarian and absolutist. Utilitarianism is concerned with what will occur and absolutism is concerned with one’s actions (W&M 52). The difference between utilitarianism and absolutism is in its choices for certain means or ends.
Concerned with one’s actions in warfare, Nagel argues that there are moral restrictions on which the rules of war are based. He points out that the two types of absolutist restrictions on the conduct of war are the legitimate target that hostility can be directed to and the level of hostility that can be used on the target (W&M 67). Given the attack of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Nagel argues that by attacking the civilian population who pose no threat at all, the United States is wrongfully directing their hostility to the enemy’s vulnerable area when their hostility should be directed instead at the enemy’s government and military forces (W&M 68). Also, by dropping two indiscriminate instruments of death, one is treating one’s enemy and the civilians with very little of the respect that all human beings deserve (W&M 68). To define the first absolutist restriction, Nagel distinguishes between the combatants and the non-combatants based on their immediate threat or harmfulness (W&M 69). He rules out women and children as non-combatants, including the unarmed men and the supporting personnel who only cater to the needs of the combatants (W&M 69). For the second absolutist restriction, Nagel extends the idea that atomic bombs and other cruel weapons like starvation, poisoning, infectious diseases or weapons that are designed to disfigure, maim, or torture people, should not be used because they do not attempt to discriminate in their effects between the combatant and the human being (W&M 70). Nagel concludes the absolutist restrictions with the idea that even if the conflict is not between two military armies or governments but instead, the entire nation, this does not justify either side to combat against every aspect of the other nation (W&M 71).
This thought reminded me of the present day war between terrorism and the Western World. It also called to mind of the recent major bombing of Moscow’s subway station by a seventeen year old widow looking to avenge for her terrorist husband. It turns out her situation is not unique in that there has been a new phenomenon of “Black Widows” or young women recruited by terrorist organizations to be sent off as human bombs to kill the Russian civilians. This method of “war” would be totally new to Nagel because women and, in this case, children are no longer considered only non-combatants. Nagel would also disapprove of this method of war because the terrorists are targeting the civilians, rather than directly at their true aim, modernization. But how does one combat modernization? However, one can also argue that the war between terrorism and the Western World is not the same kind of war that Nagel was referring to. Still, I would say that war is war and all warfare should involve the moral restrictions.

Alternative Routes to General Happiness

In this section of Method of Ethics, Sidgwick posses the idea that a Utilitarian can come up with a rule which leads to a more general happiness but this rule differs from the rules which follow “common sense.” The new rule which can lead to general happiness has both positive and negative differences. He says in order for this new rule to work, he must “estimate the force of certain disadvantages necessarily attendant upon such innovations” (476). Sidgwick says that since one’s own happiness is a part of the universal end, he must consider the effects this new rule may have on him as well as others closely related to him.
Many calculations are needed for the Utilitarian in order to see if it is a good idea to implement the new rule in favor of the generally accepted rule. He warns however, that many people who are the first to try and make a change fail and if they wait for the change to happen gradually it will be more welcomed by others. He also warns that if this new rule is established it may not be initially followed by everyone. Sidgwick says, it is “easier to weaken or destroy the restraining force that a moral rule, habitually and generally obeyed, has over men’s minds than to substitute for it a new restraining habit, not similarly sustained by tradition and custom” (477). He is emphasizing that it is much easier to possibly modify or completely dispel a rule, rather than create a new rule which conflicts with common sense. Along with the negative differences the new rule may bring, it will also bring positive differences as well, such as providing a more “stricter interpretation to the general duty of General Benevolence, where Common sense leaves it loose and indeterminate”(479). He is saying that whatever is right for him to do, he can recommend to another person to do the same thing because it is leading to a general universal happiness.
Sidgwick brings up the point that maybe the main issue does not circle around whether or not following Utilitarian ways leads to a more general happiness, than following common sense, but should exceptions be allowed to rules which both sides consider valid? This is an interesting point which I think changes his entire argument. Before he was arguing that there are instances in which Utilitarian’s create new rules, which differ from rules followed by common sense, and lead to a more general happiness. But now he is saying that maybe each side is arguing over making exceptions to the rules rather than implementing a new rule. The question I would pose is which would ultimately provide an easier route to establishing a more general happiness, creating a new rule or making exceptions to ones already established? I think Sidgwick would say that making exceptions or modifications would be an easier and more effective way of attaining a general happiness. I think he would say this because he stated it was much harder for everyone to buy into a newly implemented rule, rather than just conforming to the slight modifications to a rule. The exceptions would be a slight adjustment to the rules for which everyone would be able to follow. Another question arises is are the exceptions the same for everyone or do they change depending on the circumstances?

What makes you happiest?

For me personally being in my happiest state consists of the simplest of things life has to offer; cold coffee, dark chocolate and fast cars. But how Mill would classify such things is unbenounced to me. Nor do I find myself to really care because I feel it makes me happy and that’s all that should matter in the end.

In Mill’s chapter two of utilitarianism, he is quoted as saying “ it is better to be a human dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied, and if the pig and fool are of different opinions, it is because they only know one side of the question.”

I must say, the first time I read this the first thing that ran threw my mind was ‘what a pretentious jerk.’ Then after further dissection of the quotation I have come to understand it better, just not completely. In my opinion I believe that according to Mill, happiness is broken down; quantity versus quality and animal versus human and that the quality of happiness is valued greater over quality and human pleasures are greater then those of someone seeking animalistic pleasure.

Human please has a greater worth that that of animalistic because it requires a higher demand of our intellectual faculties. Therefore, if you were to compare watching TV over a Broadway production the person respecting human pleasure would rather watch a Broadway play because they are more cultured and appreciate the higher intellectual gain. If the person seeking pleasures derived from just TV, than they value the quantity of the pleasure over the content and quality. The result of watching TV is then to be considered animalist pleasures because they are not administering their intellectual capabilities. While I am not sold one hundred percent on Mill’s theory, I see the message that he is trying to get across, that the cliché ignorance is bliss may not always be the case. Furthermore, Mill’s theory does not always hold true in all instances. For example, there are some that find pleasure in simple food rather then that artfully prepared by a chef after experiencing both.

While I am not judging anyone who prefers animalistic pleasures over human or vice versa, I know now that Mill’s quote regarding humans and pigs is refereeing to the people who are best qualified to judge the quality of pleasure are the people who have been on both sides of the fence so to speak. That is because these people who are so highly qualified have experienced both the animal and human pleasures life has to offer and realize that human pleasures may contain more worth in regards to happiness as opposed to others.

Mill Just Wants Everyone to Get Along

In order for society to strive for the greater good as a whole, Mill points out that only well-developed humans can make this possible. The reason for this is that a well-developed human, that is containing a strong sense of morality according to Mill’s standards, has control of his emotions.. One who exercises a strong moral worth is one who only wants to promote happiness to all other to gain unity. Mill writes, “…the horror of crime is in an ordinarily well-brought up young person” (Mill 73). What he means here is that young, under-developed people will not understand how to feel united because they have not yet learned that this promotion of happiness to others, and therefore unity, is a part of our consciousness and a part of our nature. It is our duty to strive for happiness within and for others.

Mill also points out that this is our moral obligation. That is, the principle of utility, which is achieving the greatest amount happiness for the greatest amount of people, is necessary for moral decision making. In order to understand our moral obligation we must experience breaks in our mass of feeling. Mill writes, “…a mass of feeling which must be broken through in order to do what violates our standard of right,” must be necessary in our experience in order for us to understand what constitutes our ‘origin of conscience’ (Mill 75). He then points out at this constitutes our ultimate sanction. We should not be embarrassed of other people’s moral standards, only be conscientious of all people and their feelings, whether they conflict with ours or not. Essentially we must be tolerant of all people, no matter what, because in order for humankind to strive for the greater good, we must gain an objective stance on other people’s feelings.

When we finally recognize general happiness as the ethical standard, it will constitute the strength of the utilitarian morality (Mill 77). Only with this understanding will we understand the kind of equality which is necessary for mankind’s unity. Again, as I stated in my title, Mill just wants everyone to understand each other’s ultimate goal so that we can promote happiness and get along. I know your parents don’t like a certain neighbor but they should not do anything to ruin their reputation, but they should understand that they are working for happiness in their individual way and should promote it if anything. Don’t get me wrong, I would get mad too if their dog was crapping in my yard but would you kill the dog, or just put up a fence?

Justice and Utility

Mill believes that utilitarianism to become a real way of life it is necessary to define justice within this main idea. Therefore, Mill begins to define justice first through defining what is unjust. He defines the unjust actions through five different main ideas, it is unjust to: deprive someone of their legal rights, depriving someone of something they have a moral right to possess, obtaining something that they do not morally deserve, violating an agreement with someone else, and showing favoritism to someone under inappropriate circumstances (Mill 44-45). Mill defines injustice to allow us to understand justice better.

After explaining what is unjust, Mill follows the idea of justice through history. By speaking of how each of the different ancient cultures understood justice, Mill believes that he will eventually reach what the definition of justice is. The groups most examined by Mill are the Greeks and Romans. These ancient peoples eventually recognized that although their idea of justice was simply following the law that because, “their laws had been made originally, and continued to be made, by men,” it was entirely possible that there were bad laws that had been made (47). Because of these bad laws it may become necessary to break them in certain situations. This idea of justice was also followed by Mill through Christianity; one of Christian’s main sources of law comes from the Ten Commandments which explicitly states that one should not lie. However, going back to a situation Kant used, if a life is endanger through the utilitarian idea of finding the greatest good for the whole community one should at least mislead the person because it is important to keep the good of all people in mind, because to keep a life will most likely help a community more than losing a life.

Through his examination of past cultures, Mill comes to the conclusion that the justice in its lowest form is following the law and being punished for breaking those laws. However, as he continues to write, Mill decides that justice is different for each and every person because the definition of utility for each person changes. In the end, justice seemingly coincides with the idea that every person being an individual must simply hope that they can work for the same ultimate goal of a communal happiness which would allow for justice to be found within the entire community.

Mill’s understanding of justice is so drastically different from both Kant and Aristotle, is it possible that each person must find their own, individual definition of justice, but that this definition must be in harmony with others in the community? Or do Kant and Aristotle’s definitions work better because they allow for a more rigid understanding thereby allowing everyone to have the same definition? In the end, I believe that each individual should find his or her own definition but still have a clear idea of justice in society also.

Mill's Defense of the Doctrine of Utilitarianism & its Relationship to Virtue

In J.S. Mill’s Utilitarianism, Mill alleges in Chapter IV “Of What Sort of Proof the Principle of Utility is Susceptible” that the first principles are not capable of proof by reasoning. He reiterates this basis initially introduced in Chapter II, but goes a step further in his explanation of the utilitarian doctrine as “that happiness is desirable, and that the only thing desirable, as an end; all other things being only desirable as means to that end” (Mill 35). The remainder of his argument arguably justifies this statement. Because we cannot ascertain this principle through reason, Mill argues that we know it through experience. Mill maintains the position that “No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness” (Mill 35). At first, this appears to be a very immature and unfounded argument (“I’m right because I know I’m right”) that does little to address objections to the doctrine of utility. But upon further investigation, Mill proves that the desire of things other than happiness can be decidedly distinguished from the sole desire of happiness. Mill explains that “Happiness is not an abstract idea but a concrete whole” consisting of many separate parts (Mill 38). These parts range from the love of music or the desire for health to the love of money. According to the utilitarian doctrine, virtue is not a universal but it is just as authentic as the desire for happiness. So for those who desire virtue, they do so not as “a means to happiness, but as a part of their happiness” (Mill 37). Therefore, virtue seems almost as an optional component to happiness. Unlike Aristotle, Mill does not believe that the perfection of a virtuous character will lead to the ultimate end of happiness. He acquiesces that although it may be a part of one’s happiness, the desire for the attainment of virtue is not a road map to happiness.
Returning to Mill’s initial question about what sort of proof this principle is susceptible to, he answers that “if human nature is so constituted as to desire nothing which is not either a part of happiness or a means of happiness – we can have no other proof, and we require no other, that these are the only things desirable” (Mill 39). Mill argues that since all human beings desire the same thing – happiness (whether directly or indirectly, in some way or another) than there can exist no opposition to this argument and he does not require a proof to prove his point. Is this true? Do we truly need no logical or rational proof to justify the pursuit of happiness? Also, how can virtue be optional to happiness according to the doctrine of utilitarianism, if this same doctrine requires one to promote the greatest happiness of others? Can one help promote another’s happiness without a virtuous character? Or does the pursuit of a virtuous character (according to Aristotle or other philosophers) obstruct or blur the achievement of happiness?

"Reasons We Can Share"

Philosophers have defined primal morality as an act done for or to someone else. Christine Korsgaard argues that morality revolves around people doing something together. “The subject of morality is not what we should bring about, but how we relate to one another” (Korsgaard 275). The question is whether reasons and values are subjective, existing only in relation to individuals, or objective, there for everyone?

Subjective reasons are actions done for one self, for example, promoting your own happiness. Subjective reasons are declared “good-for”. Objective reasons are actions done for anyone, for example, promoting the happiness of yourself and some one else. This is considered “good-absolutely”. There is a second interpretation of “good-absolutely” that has an intrinsic value, meaning that it provides a reason for both people to act for one another.

In “Reasons We Can Share” Korsgaard makes the claim that reasons and values are objective. She argues against Thomas Nagel who believes reasons and values are subjective. Nagel posits that all subjective reasons must be taken in order to have objective correlates. “If it is good for me to have something, then we must regard it as good-absolutely that I should have it” (Nagel 277). To counter this argument Korsgaard gives the example of someone being bullied. According to Nagel’s argument the person who is being bullied resents the action and because he resents it then the bully should as well. But Korsgaard argues that the person who is being a bully should know not to bully people because he would not like it done to him. Korsgaard applies relational concepts (objective) while Nagel proposes individual concepts (subjective). Nagel says that in order for us to relate with other people we must find an understanding in ourselves while Korsgaard says that we can act morally to other people because we know they exist.

Nagel re-claims his statement and states that some actions are purely subjective neutral and that objective reasons are not necessary in these actions. Nagel gives the example of climbing a mountain; stating that the action of climbing will only bring happiness to one person. Korsgaard counters his argument by stating that Nagel’s example can be defined as an ambition. Furthermore, ambitions are put in place because people have already put an objective realist interpretation. She gives the example of viewing a painting or eating chocolate. Someone who eats chocolate likes it and someone who does not can potentially be missing out on some sort of value. But these values where already put in place by the masses not by an individual, thus stating that individuals react in an objective manner rather than subjective.

Korsgaard main point; “to say you have a reason is to say something relational, something which implies the existence of another, at least another self” (Korsgaard 301).
Moreover, normative claims are claims that we make on ourselves and with each other. Thus, Korsgaard disproves Nagel by claiming that acknowledging another person is not a reason to treat someone in a certain way but “rather something that stands behind the very possibility of reasons” (Korsgaard 301).

I agree that can not exert claims on others without realizing that other people exist. I also agree that the world is a relational and interdependent place. One can not exist by him or herself. I feel that Korsgaard’s point has human character taken into account while Nagel’s point claims that individuals act out of purely individualistic which is not a reality.

All for One and None for All

According to Sedgwick, Egoistic Hedonism is the most “despicable and base” (Methods of Ethics 413) of the three methods of Ethics as, by definition, it affirms that each individual should aim to promote his/her own happiness. This however appears to be less about instinctive principle and more about social construction. Sedgwick than proceeds to persuade a fantastic Egoist in adopting universalist ideas, conclusively affirming the only means of successively proving the first principle of Utilitarianism to a true Egoist is to assert a general sanction that his happiness is ultimately dependent on the happiness of others (Method of Ethics 416).

While this author has no issue with the above conclusion, Sedgwick ruins an otherwise justifiable proof by furthering this argument with an actual hypothetical discussion to convince the Egoist to accept Universalist doctrine. Sedgwick writes:

“When the Egoist puts forward…the proposition that his happiness or pleasure is Good, not only for him but from the point of view of the universe…by saying ‘nature designed him to seek his own happiness,’ It then becomes relevant to point out to him that that his happiness cannot be a more important part of good than the equal happiness of any other person. And thus…may be brought to accept universal happiness or pleasure… (Methods of Ethics 416-417)”

While the first part of Sedgwick’s conclusive statement makes much sense as it is sensible to assume that convincing an egoist to adopt altruistic dogmas is to cater to his/her self-centered ideals, the example discussion makes no sense as a true Egoist would simply say “says who?”The Egoist would not be persuaded by a simple reiteration of the primary difference between Egoists and Universalists, regardless of the latter’s use of the formers own principle. While I believe it is true that as humans we are naturally prone to avoid pain and enjoy personal pleasures, I do not believe that these pleasures should be enjoyed at the expense of others. However an Egoistic has no concerns for the welfare or general happiness of others; only insofar the welfare and happiness of the other concerns those of the the Egoist. Because of this, the above scenario would not work as the Egoist will not care about whether the overall populace is happy or not or whether his happiness is the most important part of good or not. Perhaps the Universalist could have just said that, naturally speaking, if the many are happy they are more likely to tend to the happiness of the one. Otherwise, How could we convince such a self-absorbed body that Utilitarianism is all about the collective happiness?

The Real Deal This Time

For Kant, virtue is practical reason's highest unconditional end. Virtue is it own end and, "because of the merit which men accord it, is also its own reward"(Metaphysics 396). Indeed, Kant says that man has obligation to be virtuous. The duties of virtue for Kant read as such; (1) my own end, which is at the same time my duty, (2) the end of others, whose promotion is at the same time my duty, i.e. the happiness of others, (3) the law which is at the same time an incentive, on which the morality of every free determination of the will rests, and (4). the end which is at the same time an incentive, on which the legality of every free determination of the will rests(Metaphysics 398). These qualities of moral feeling, conscience, love of one's neighbor, and respect for yourself lie in everyone and are the natural predispositions that lead us to a concept of duty.

Moral feeling is the pleasure or displeasure that comes from the conscious as to whether or not one's actions is with the law of duty(399). Moral feeling is cultivated by recognizing that the strongest excitement comes from following reason. We don't have a sense for moral good or evil only a free choice influenced by pure reason.

Kant describes conscience as, "practical reason, holding up before a man his duty for acquittal or condemnation case under a law"(Metaphysics 400). As with all four of these, they exist in all of us. So the phrase that one has no conscious only means that one will not had their conscious. The only duty concerned with conscious is to cultivate it.

Love or a lack thereof doesn't concern duty for Kant, since benevolence can be subject to a law of duty, and is therefore is neccesary regardless of love(401). We can also not have a duty for respect, since this would be like having an obligation to have a duty. Respect is necessary for one to understand duty.

Kant goes onto propose three maxims of the scientific treatment of a doctrine of virue to oppose the old ones. These new ones are: (1) a duty can only have a single ground of obligation, (2) the difference between virtue and vice only concern the specific qualities of the maxim, and (3). ethical duties must be estimated in accordance with the law(Metaphysics 404).

Overall virtue is our moral strength of the will of us in obeying duty(Metaphysics 405). Virtue posses us since if we owned it then we could discard it, and need a virtue to make that choice. Internal freedom is the condition of every duty of virtue, with two things being required for internal freedom; master of oneself in a given case, and to be able to govern ones emotions and passions(Metaphysics 407). Emotions proceed reflection, while passion tends to be worse since one reflect and commits the action anyway. There are three principles for the division of the doctrine of virtue: no external legislation can exist for them, the law of duty is for the maxim of actions, and ethical duty must be conceived as broad duty(410). It must on top of this be a doctrine of ends, so that we oneself and everyone else as an end.

Kant says that we must subdue our emotions and passions, but one most admit that this is rather difficult. Would not be better, or is it possible to cultivate our emotions and our passions as Kant says we can with our conscious?

How Do We Decide Which Way to Live our Lives?

The question that one really faces here is what do people really believe our duty as a human is? If one acts morally correct that means we are following certain rules or a distinct way of life under restrictions of right and wrong. According to Davis, if one has these beliefs, there has to be some wrong in one self, “thus morally unacceptable,” (Davis, 205). This belief is what is called deontology. This meaning a study of nature of responsibility and obligation, instead of those who are known as teleologists, where right and wrong are determined by the consequences of our actions (Davis, 205). As a deontologist, one is not able to see the difference between what is right and what is good. For one to be moral, one must follow a set of rules as a guide for their way of life. If there are no consequences when something is done wrong, how do we then again determine it is wrong? Opposed to consequentialism, our action leads to a certain result, which is the consequence one receives for their doing. Is it morally correct to only follow these certain constraints that deontologists are supposed to follow? Meaning, deontologists live their lives very carefully because one must always know and be able to judge what is wrong before we even acting upon it. For one to be a follower of deontology one must follow a certain structure, and only that structure. If we fail to do something then we must consciously know we are not acting correctly, and that in the end there is no way to get around doing bad.

Deontology, maintains the wrongness in our actions before a consequence is even determined to result in that action. Davis also goes on to explain deontological constraints are also “narrowly directed.” The consequence does not change from action to action. If one does something deliberately, one must pay the price. “ We are not as responsible for the foreseen consequences of our actions as we are for the things that we intend,” (Davis 209). Does this mean that one is more responsible for the actions that they perform, then they are for the actual consequences that really result from them? For example, if an innocent man was murdered, the idea of killing is wrong, deontologists forget to recognize the consequence of ones action. Killing an innocent man can tear a family apart and cause much grief. If we don’t think about the consequences of our actions that is not morally correct. Shouldn’t we always be aware of what our actions can cause to our environment? Deontologists are enabled to act in a way that may not necessarily be “good”, and that be okay, but for a consequentialist, your actions should always be the best ones, and never be any less. Violating the deontologist structure, means intentionally doing something not morally correct.

Although, one should know what is right and wrong automatically, there shouldn’t be only a set of rules that one must follow to live a moral life. Whether or not you choose to live a deontological or consequential life, shouldn’t we live by both? Yes, we should have laws to follow, but we should also be given a consequence for our actions, good or bad. That is what makes one a better person to learn to live a moral and successful life.

Kant: A True Friend with Respect for Others

Firstly, Kant commences the discourse of this section in explaining the respect that all humans owe to other human beings. He specifically states from the start that, “Every man has a rightful claim of respect from his fellow men, and he is also bound to show respect to every other man in return” (Metaphysics 462). In this specific section, Kant will also go on to say how respect is a moral duty that can be compromised by the characters of pride, slander, and mockery, but are also essential to friendship; friendship, which is also a duty but in a more realistic manner than we have previously seen in Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics.

Kant formally makes the claim that all humans are required to show respect, due to the fact that humans need to maintain the dignity that is existent among humanity (Metaphysics 462), which also shows a sort of worth within our culture. But it is not only the respect of other people that humans must follow; Kant explains that respect for the law is the respect that precedes any other kind of respect. If one respects the law and the universal maxims in society, it is implied that one will also have respect for humanity. As a duty, the respect that one gives to mankind and to the law of the land is described by Kant as the “respectable” and “decent” thing to do (Metaphysics 464). On the other hand, the characteristics of pride, calumny, and mockery are described by Kant as a loss of respect and dignity for humanity (466). Kant specifically states that these characteristics “cast a shadow of worthlessness upon our species…” (466). Therefore, respect is a duty among all humans, which represents our dignity and, in a way, our superiority among all other species that exist on the Earth.

Finally, Kant describes friendship and its relationship with respect in the last discourse of this section. What is more interesting in this section, though, are the differences that can be seen between the arguments of Kant and Aristotle on the matter of friendship. The main difference is Kant’s perception of “reality” in friendship. He maintains the argument that a true friendship, the union of two people, is realistic and may not always be moral, but he agrees with Aristotle in stating that there are no true models of friends amongst us (470). He maintains the realism in his argument in stating that, “it is a burden to feel oneself tied to the destiny of others and laden with alien responsibilities” (470). Therefore, Kant agrees that fights are common among friendships, but what makes a friendship truly moral is the mutual openness between the individuals (471), not that the individuals have to be mirror images of each other as Aristotle believes.

I have come to agree that Kant’s realism within his arguments are more perplexing to the notion of respect in our modern world, but I also have to question his statement that it is an “outrage to inflict punishments” among others (463). Not all humans can follow a morally just life, but that doesn’t mean that they shouldn’t try. Isn’t punishment a method in which we are able to put other humans on the right track to happiness (it does not only have to be physical punishment)? We sometimes use war as a type of punishment; are all types of punishment wrong in the eyes of Kant?

Kant, Why So Absolute?

Kant begins by defining his particular meaning of love and respect in regards to both always being combined as one duty according with the law (Metaphysics 448) that we, as rational beings, would legislate upon ourselves. Both are abstracted from any kind of sentimental connotation, and are instead instilled with a sense of practicality.
The duty of free respect to others entailed a negative law of duty. As such, we are free, as intelligent beings to not “exalt oneself above others” (449). Respect is thus a maxim that places intelligent, moral constraints on ones self esteem to prevent him from stepping on the dignity of another person (449). It keeps each person in obligation to himself, within his own bounds (450), and in a sense repulsed from another (449).
So what exactly provides for one person to be attracted to another? As a moral community surely cannot be comprised of people whom have nothing to bind them together; each member must not only keep from trampling on someone else’s dignity, but should actually treat that person as an end in himself rather than a subsequent means to one’s own end. This is precisely where the positive, practical aspect of love within duty makes itself crucial (450).
“The duty to love one’s neighbor can also be expressed as the duty to make the [moral] ends of others my own” (450). In other words, Kant attributes love in this moral-maxim sense insofar as it is accompanied in its definition by respect. Respect is included with love as love points out the necessity of obligating only oneself toward another in a respectful, necessary fashion and within one’s “own bounds” (450). As an obligation toward another person, here we are able to identify the positive practical attribute of duty in love.
I understand the fact that Kant is trying to classify aspects of morality in a generalized manner; however, I find myself rejecting the absoluteness with which he puts forth his claims. When speaking about love and stating that we (I) must keep within “my own bounds” (450), how exactly would these “bounds” be able to be identified cross-culturally as a single, absolute way of one’s obligatory actions in relation to another person? For surely there are norms in some countries that people from a different country would find peculiar, or in the worst-case-scenario, completely disrespectful. For instance, a married woman from Saudi Arabia is required to get her “husband's permission to depart the country, while unmarried women and children require the permission of their father or male guardian” (Saudi Arabia). Many people whom have grown up in the US would likely be very shocked by this treatment of an adult female; nevertheless, with the religious and cultural background of Saudi Arabia, nothing else could be considered more normal in terms of the obligations people have toward one another in that particular country.
So my concern rests in how exactly Kant would be able to explain his way out of such a drastic cultural disparity in terms of moral obligations one person would feel they have toward another. It seems to me that he claims the possibility of an absolute sense of what is moral and what is not. But surely, many unmarried 30-year-old women in the US do not feel morally obliged to ask their fathers’ permission to travel out of the country, thus undermining any applicable absolute rule common to both cultures.
Kant may answer my apprehension toward accepting such an unconditional claim with the use of this example by saying that, A) it has nothing to do with “depriving another of any of the value which he has as a human being” (450), or B) that ways of acting morally toward one another may, indeed, differ with regards to cultural background.
In response to A, I would claim that a relativistic example such as this does have a great deal to do with - in the mindset of the Saudi Arabian culture in the strict sense – the value one would feel in their human dignity, in the sense that if an unmarried woman did not ask her father’s permission (for instance, if she didn’t have the time to), she would most likely feel a negative affect within her own self-value, and her father would probably feel offended in his own person and depraved of fruitful emotional value in some sense. Thus, such a simple cultural norm that differs so drastically from ours can indeed affect the sense of value in at least one person involved. But how exactly would Kant explain this cultural phenomenon of difference in what would affect one’s sense of value? I see nowhere his mentioning anything with reference to the relativity between cultures, religions, or norms. This would be my reply to answer B, as these varieties in what different peoples of this world consider “normal” ways of conducting themselves is not even recognized in his writings. Without explicitly acknowledging culturally-based variation between peoples, I can only assume the absoluteness of his considerations, with which I cannot agree.


"Saudi Arabia." Welcome to Travel.State.Gov. U.S. State Department, 26 May 2009. Web. 31 Mar. 2010. http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1012.html.

Kant's Version of That Speech We All Got in Little League About Having Given It Our Best

For Kant it is impossible to think of anything in the entire world that, “could be considered good without limitation except a good will"(Groundwork 393). All other qualities, can be good, but can also be used for evil, they are not intrinsically good. This good will is not good based off of the ends that may be accomplished, “but because of its volition, that is it is good in itself"(394). Now, Kant goes onto say that the highest purpose of each individual is self-preservation and gaining happiness, and that reason is a pure choice for this activity. Reason, instead, serves a higher purpose and that is the purpose of bringing into fruition a will that is good in itself (396). The good will's specific obligations are called duties.

Kant goes onto to make three propositions about duty. The first being that actions are good when undertaken solely for the sake of duty. However, people tend to conform to duty out of other interests. They may have an immediate inclination, like a shopkeeper who gives everyone the same price, not because shopkeepers have a duty to do this, but because it is in his best interest to have a fair price (397). The second proposition is that an action from duty, "has its moral worth not in the purpose to be attained by it but in the maxim in accordance which it is decided upon"(399), and the moral worth does not matter if the object of the action is realized but that they do it out of duty. If an action is done solely out of duty it is because the actor recognized an a priori moral principle. The third proposition is that, "duty is the necessity of an action from respect for the law"(400). All living things can act out from instinct, and in random situations it could lead to something beneficial. Rational beings see that there is a moral law and their actions are out of respect for it. Moral law cannot be based off of specific situations but it must make sense in all situations, being universal. The law of morality causes you to ask the question, "can you also will that your maxim become universal law? If not then it is to be repudiated"(403).

In the beginning of section 2, Kant admits that, "even most of our actions are in conformity with duty"(407), and that it is near impossible to find actions done solely out of duty. However, Kant insists that we should not lose heart. We should recognize that we could not get universal laws from specific situations since they are all dependent of specific circumstances. No single experience can be the source for universal law and applied to all situations.

Now in our society we can see elements of Kant, and elements concerned merely on the outcome. In our society today are we leaning more towards Kant in that we applaud actions only because of their moral worth or solely based on their outcomes? Both are present in today’s society, but which is more prevalent?

Autonomy and Heteronomy

When rational beings pursue the kingdom of ends and morality, an independence of their will is established known as autonomy (Greek for self law, Merriam-Webster dictionary). Autonomous beings are self-legislating and act according to the categorical imperative, their moral actions are taken from the sake of duty alone. An autonomous person’s maxims are in accord with the universal law which is an imperative that human beings will is necessarily bound to the rule (440).
When a rational being’s goals are determined by something other than universal law, and if the will “goes out of itself and seeks the law” in the character of its object then heteronomy results (441). Kant believes that the moral imperative must be abstract from every object so that nothing and no object has any influence on the will (441). This shows that autonomy is consistent with morality and heteronomy is not.
Kant goes on to show us that there are some principles that we would mistake as a basis of morality when in fact they are heteronomous. These two principles are the empirical principle and the rational principle. Empirical principles are unsuited to serve as a foundation for moral laws, they can never have the status of universal laws of nature (442). Rational principles are also heteronomous because they do not come from the pure concept of reason (442). Whenever someone does something in order to attain something else (even if it’s happiness of any kind of desire) the person's will and freedom is determined by that something else which therefore makes it heteronomous (442).
When most people speak of autonomy they mean the way in which an individual is free, however Kant brings up the point that we are most free when we give ourselves a law. Does Kant contradict himself when he says this, or can this be possible?
I think that Kant is trying to establish a common moral law for everyone to follow. For Kant a person is moral only if he acts morally not in his own interest but in the interest of everyone. Everyone is held together by universal laws and this makes the universal laws moral. Kant tells us that an autonomous will produces a universal law for morality that everyone can follow and that a heteronomous will produces false principles of morality that not everyone can follow (441).

The Kingdom of a Common Law

In this second section, Kant goes on to establish why a categorical imperative must exist. He finds that there must be a "supreme practical principle," that is, a categorical imperative (429). He does so by speaking of a "kingdom of ends" in which is a "systematic union of different rational beings through common laws" (433). In the kingdom of ends, a person must treat other people as ends, not as means (429). Kant says that this categorical imperative, or law, is in the context of a "kingdom" because all people must be subject to the law (433).

However, Kant seems to contradict himself when he claims that in the kingdom each rational being can be seen either as a member (legislator) or a sovereign (434). The sovereign is not subject to any will and must be an "independent being without needs" and have "unlimited power adequate to his will" (434). However, Kant does not seem to further discuss the case for the sovereign; perhaps there is only one sovereign, the "Holy One of the gospel" (408). Speaking of the members, Kant says that they are subject to the laws which they, the members, legislate. Within this kingdom, where all people are subject to the law, a member cannot use other people as a means for his end, rather each person must be an end.

In the kingdom, if the laws are universal and not based on a single interest, then they are unconditional (435). Further, morality is a key component of the kingdom, becoming the basis in determining whether or not there is a categorical imperative. Kants says that each legislator must be a moral person because only through moral actions can a person be an ends (435). If each person if moral, then he acts not in his own interest, but on the interest of everyone, producing laws which can be held unconditionally. Thus, the categorical imperative that people are held together by these universal laws which are legislated by the people is true.

As Kant does not seem to further address the issue of a sovereign, does this leave open the possibility for another situation which may support the categorical imperative? Kant's claim that each person must act morally suggests that everyone will indeed act morally. It seems that as soon as not everyone acts morally, the categorical imperative is no longer true. Perhaps there is a condition under which not all people must always be acting morally for this principle to be true. Is this condition the sovereign and is he exempt from factoring into the categorical imperative?

Kant on Imperatives and Universal Law

Kant begins by telling us that there are three imperatives that we must be aware of. The imperatives are techincal (belonging to the art), pragmatic (belonging to welfare), and moral (belonging to free conduct as such, i.e., to morals).(26-7) He then poses the question of how these imperatives are possible. To answer the question, Kant begins to describe the relationship between the wills to the end and the means or actions that allow us to arrive at this end. This theory is described as being analytic, as the logic concerning the means and the end is a linear process. We initiate the actions or the will to accomplish a specific end, knowing that the "proposed result can come about only by means of such an action..."(27) Therefore, the course of action involving the means and the end, Kant concludes, is analytic because the end is acquired through the means. Here, I agree with Kant because we have situations where this is true. For example, if Michael Phelps wants to be the best swimmer in the world, he knows that he must spend 12 hours in the pool each day to achieve the highest level of swimming. Phelps desires an end (greatest swimmer), therefore he desires the means to that end (swimming 12 hours per day).



On the other hand, there are no precise imperatives that we can use to determine the concept of happiness. In this case, it is similar to the case above in that "whoever wills the end also wills the sole means thereto which are in his power."(27) In simpler words, to desire an end is to also desire the means which will accomplish that end. In order to obtain or achieve happiness, we must be willing to do things which will give us the feeling of happiness. Happiness changes from person to person, having no definitive substance. Kant states that this is true because happiness is unexceptionally emipirical. We find happiness through the experiences that we have gone through in the past, which decides what we choose to do in order to experience happiness. He goes on to say that no specific imperative can make one person happy. I agree with the fact that one imperative cannot make a person happy, since one imperative will sacrifice health or happiness of another imperative. For example, if I decide to eat a chocolate cake, that will achieved by the pragmatic imperative, which will deal with improving my welfare or happiness by fulfilling my desire to eat the cake. At the same time, this imperative will be contradicting the pragmatic imperative because of the extremely detrimental effect it will have on my health, which is directly correlated to my welfare and well being.



The moral imperative is the most difficult because there is no action or imperative that can show there is a moral imperative present. The moral imperative would not be present in this case if there was anarchy and no law. Moral imperative is present because we know the actions will lead to a desired end, along with the punishment that follows the action. If someone wants to kill a person on the street, they desire the actions that will lead to the results they wished for. Yet, this person does not kill them because of the law that makes it illegal to murder someone. If this statute was not in effect, the desired end could be achieved without hesitiation, proving that absence of moral imperative.



This leads us to the question: is it necessary law for all rational beings always to judge their actions according to such maxims as they can themselves will that such should serve as universal laws? I say no. Acting as rational people, we can all agree on universal laws, such as thou shalt not kill, steal, etc. How do these laws apply to people that are homeless or cannot afford to survive under this universal law? They can justify stealing a loaf of bread by saying that they need to survive as well as provide for a hungry family. Here we see that even though there should be one standard of universal law, people can create different levels of universal law to justify their survival in this world.

The question I pose is: Are their different levels of universal law for different kinds of people? Or is it that there is one universal law with people that either abide by it or break it? Also, can a moral imperative be judged immoral even if it results directly in your survival? Are there imperatives that triumph or come before other imperatives in our daily lives?

Kant on Happiness and Morality: Are They Different?

In Kant’s discussion of metaphysics, he argues that, as reason determines a man’s will, he acts on his will only according to what he recognizes as “being practically necessary, i.e., as good” (412). So, man strives for what he thinks is good and necessary. When he acts according to purely objective principles, he acts according to commands of reason called imperatives (413). These objective principles are universal, and therefore not subjective to circumstance or individual experience. Kant also outlines two kinds of imperatives: hypothetical and categorical. A hypothetical imperative means that an action is necessary as a means to some end, while a categorical imperative means that an action is necessary in and of itself (415). He states that there is one universal end necessitating hypothetical imperatives that all rational beings strive for: happiness (415). Similarly there is one categorical imperative which applies to all rational beings: morality (416).

Thus Kant creates a clear distinction between happiness and morality. Both are objective means, and as all rational beings strive for each, both are grounded firmly in reason. Yet, they are not identical, as one is a means and one is an end. Thus one’s action can be qualified as good either because happiness is the end of this action or because the action is morally good.

In this sense, it seems that Kant makes a fairly substantial break from Aristotle. Aristotle argued that morality (i.e. virtue) is good as it brings about happiness, and happiness is good as the end of virtue. Happiness and complete virtue seem to be one in the same and both good by the same intrinsic principle, as one cannot be happy without virtue and one is happy if he is virtuous. Kant, on the other hand, makes happiness and morality separate products of reason. Any action towards happiness is justified solely by this end, while any moral action is justified solely in and of itself. Kant states that morality is the “one imperative which immediately commands a certain conduct without having as its condition any other purpose to be attained by it” (416). Thus, if our actions are truly moral, there need not be any purpose or end; we act according to this imperative not because of what it attains but because it is good.

In light of Kant’s argument I pose my question thusly: Does Kant’s definition of morality as intrinsically good without having an end hold up, or must all moral actions have an end such as happiness, as Aristotle suggests? In other words, is Kant correct in separating happiness and morality?

Kant's golden rule.

For all of his ambiguities, Kant sums up his description of duty quite clearly through the use of his catagorical imperative, which can be stated as "I should never act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law" (Kant, 14). According to Kant, it is by following this law that we act in accordance with duty without any worry of accidentally acting on inclinations or for the purpose of producing an end (which both hold no moral worth).

To be honest, this is the first time I've found Kant really making sense. Throughout his description of duty and all of the ways in which an action can be considered immoral, he maintained that the only actions that are completely morally right are those that are good in and of themselves. To finally make this more clear, he introduced the means by which we can decide what these actions are: a universal law. To restate this law in more simplified terms, an action can be considered morally correct if it can be turned into a law that everyone must abide by. He uses one particular example to illustrate this idea. He asks if it would be morally acceptable to make a promise with no intention of keeping it if he were to be in a state of distress. Since it is fairly obvious that there should be no such law stating "everyone must always make false promises in order to avoid distressful situations," as then there would be no such thing as a honest promise, we can conclude that this action is not good.

Therefore, in order that our will's may be morally good, we must only ask ourselves whether we can also will that our maxims should become universal law, and if we wouldn't will them to be universal law, the answer is clearly no. I've decided to try and live by Kant's law according to this weekend an see how it works out. First action I will to be universal law? "Everyone must always go and see Alice and Wonderland"

Kant Traps Himself

Kant begins section 397 by stating that, “The concept of a will estimable in itself and good without regard to any further end must now be developed” (Kant, 9). Kant sees the moral content with regards to duty, only when things are done for the sake of doing them, not as a result of any external factors. He argues, rightfully so, that to preserve one’s life is a duty but Kant believes that this duty only has moral content if that person preserves it, “[W]ithout loving it” (Kant, 10). In effect, is arguing that our actions are only moral or virtuous insofar as they are done solely because of our responsibility to do them; our actions themselves must be self-sufficient.

I do not believe that Kant’s views about will and duty are anything more than theoretical. He uses the example of the person who wishes to die, but maintains themselves alive for nothing other than basic laws of self-preservation, as an example of an act with moral content. I would argue that if a person wishes to die and has yet to, then they do in fact fear suicide and their self-preservation is motivated by a fear of death. I would also contend that someone who’s life has been defined by existence for the sake of others, like Mother Teresa for example, has a much greater moral content than someone who maintains themselves alive for no reason.

I also believe that Kant traps himself when he writes, “To secure one’s own happiness is a duty” (Kant, 12). If happiness is defined as the end of all things achievable in action, then every single one of our actions is characterized by its aim towards happiness. Aristotle argued that we cannot be happy after death and so we must remain alive in order to be happy. Every step that we take to maintain ourselves alive because it would lead happiness is a step devoid of moral content according to Kant. According to Kant, we have a duty to maintain ourselves alive solely for the sake of doing so whilst having a duty to secure our own happiness. If our actions are not geared towards happiness, which by Kant’s own logic they shouldn’t be, then happiness becomes a carrot-on-a-stick and is not worth discussing.

Case in point, we can eat just enough to survive but still be unhealthy, according to Kant this would have moral content because it is solely a step towards self-preservation for no real reason. If we were unhealthy however, we’d be hard-pressed to secure happiness but if we eat enough so that we are healthy and thus happy, then suddenly our act of self-preservation has no moral content. In effect, Kant’s argument is flawed.

If everything that we do must be done for the sake of itself, then how can we do anything aimed towards securing happiness?

Misology...Philosophical Blasphemy.

I found it extremely interesting that not even two full pages into Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals Immanuel Kant brings up the idea of misology, or the hatred of reason. Kant believes this to be truly present in those "most experienced in the use of reason" because after they actually think back on their lives they "find that they have in fact only brought more trouble on their heads than they have gained in happiness. (Groundwork 8-9)

So, Kant (a philosopher), is trying to say that those who find themselves reasoning most often (usually philosophers) look back on their lives and wish they had just been dull drones like the rest of the masses so they didn't realize how little they've accomplished towards make themselves happy. This is far from the praise the Greek philosophers gave to those who dedicated their time to logic and reasoning. If Plato was in charge, all our leaders would be depressed, psychiatric patients dreading the next time they delved into deep thought.

Well, as it obviously did for me, Kant declaring that the thinkers of the world wish they weren’t thinkers can seriously derail a reader from paying attention to the actual arguments. Kant introduces the idea of misology not to tell us that reason is bad and will only make us unhappy, but that we may have been thinking about reason in the wrong ways. For example, Greek philosophers usually thought that reason was the ultimate channel through which we reach happiness. A life spent pondering what is good would lead to a virtuous and satisfactory life. However, Kant seems to think that this would simply be a waste of our reason. He says our “instincts” are there to make us happy, our reason exists bring about a life and will that is good in itself. (Groundwork 8) Striving for one’s own happiness is a good for a particular purpose (one’s own happiness) and is therefore not truly good in Kant’s definition of good.

And, in this argument Kant really informs his audience of why the arch-enemy of philosophy can exist in a world that has hope. Misology isn’t really a hatred of reasoning but a hatred of the misuse of reasoning. See reasoning is like a kazoo. Some people can use reason to best bend their will into something truly good in itself just as some people can play great, if not glorious, songs on a kazoo. Then there are others who only use reason to ponder their own purposes eventually realizing it’s not leading them to happiness. These people are like that one guy who is continually blowing the same note into an innocent kazoo for the entire hour after it hits their mouth.

And that’s how I taught myself Kant today!

Morality

In the preface of Ethical philosophy, the author Kant states there are three divisions of science philosophy. The three divisions are physics ethics and logic. He also describes philosophy to have multiple parts. Material philosophy is concerned with the interaction of objects in relationships with the laws of nature and freedom. Formal philosophy is considered to be one of the three sciences of philosophy logic. Kant throughout the preface focuses on the idea of moral philosophy. He also discusses the idea of moral philosophy of being evident in society’s laws and also evident in the idea of moral and duty because we follow certain ethical acts like the example he states of thou shall not lie (2). In the preface he discusses the idea a book on metaphysics of morals.

Kant’s main idea throughout the preface is that morality comes from just being rationale. He believes if one is rationale they should be able to make good decisions. I believe Kant’s idea of moral philosophy is evident today, and the idea of laws influencing ideas to reflect the hunger for the need of good morals. At the same time I do not believe in the idea mentioned before because there are people who do not base their decisions of law and we label them as criminals. I also believe the criminals are rationale, so would this make criminals have good will. Kant also discusses the idea of authors who do not believe in distinguishing motives based off of morals, but believe in motives based off strengths and weaknesses. This argument does not make sense to me. I believe motives are based off of beneficial significance. I also believe the significance of the decisions can be based off of good morals because most of the times the strengths of a decision are in good faith, but at the same time the strengths can be negative. Criminals are an example making decisions based on the reward behind it. I just want to know if Kant would judge people who do immoral deeds or make immoral decisions to be irrational.

A Need For Another Hero.

Tina Turner, you are wrong! The future does need another hero!!

Future generations, like present and past generations, will need heroes. Firstly, a definition of a hero needs to be established. A hero is someone who is preeminently great, yet not perfect. This person also must be someone who is essentially like us, someone we can relate to. This person must be virtuous and idealized by society for their outstanding achievements and noble qualities. Because a hero is a human being, they must have flaws, just like everyone else, yet are overshadows by their qualities. Moreover, these flaws only help in making what we consider heroes more relatable or attainable. In watching how heroes deal with their failures, we learn how to deal with our own failings.

Past generations have looked to heroes as examples of what excellence is. Heroes are people who perform their function as best as they possibly can. They are viewed as spokespeople for those who suffer from injustice and are less fortunate. Some examples from past generations include Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr. People such as them have served as examples for society.

Even today we have heroes among us- no, not like the Incredibles and Superman, but like Lance Armstrong and Paul Farmer. Take Lance Armstrong, for instance; although there are things we may disagree on about him, such as his relationship with Sheryl Crowe, overall, he serves as an example for society. May it be through his discipline and athletic ability or through his work against cancer, he is a role model for society. Similarly, Paul Farmer demonstrates his discipline through his medical work in Haiti. Both heroes do outstanding work in society and go beyond the norm to reach excellence.

Society is always in a dynamic state, constantly changing in trends and opinions. Therefore, we will always need an updated modern hero that matches our current viewpoints. Although, heroes will change, the virtue, nobility, and justice that attract us to these people remain the same. For example, the principles that Gandhi upheld have not lost relevance in today’s society.

Aristotle says we need laws as role models to live our lives. These days with the subjectivity of society, heroes function as a parallel to Aristotle’s idea of laws; we need them as examples for our lives.

So, we are sorry Tina Turner, but it’s time to get out of your depressive mood and face that fact that you picked the wrong guy. Society really does need heroes and will always be in the need of them in the future.

No Need for Another Hero

There is absolutely no need for another hero in today’s society, which is overloaded with people who are idolized as heroes. The way in which society canonizes people as heroes is by the position of power they hold, the accolades they have received, or the fame they accumulate throughout their respective careers. These are all however, personal or individualistic achievements, held only by a small percentage of society. If everyday people live their lives based on the achievements of such a small percentage of the population then people are nearly always going to fall short of their life goals because these “heroes” set a false standard for how to live a life. Trying to live a life based on others individual accomplishments and living up to their standard is not a virtuous way of life for everyone. The way in which we should determine if someone is living a virtuous life is by looking at society collectively and taking the positive aspects of what “works”.

The main reason why we do not need another hero is because we do not really know who these people are. For the most part the people who we determine as heroes, we have never talked or even met before. Yet we decide that since they are successful in what they do and are getting a tremendous amount of public attention, that they are the heroes we should try to live like. The only way we know about these heroes is through the media. We only know a very small percentage of their life and who they really are. This is a problem because when issues from their private/ unknown life leak out into the public, and we see them committing wrong doings we then see who they really are as a person, leading us to stop calling them heroes. There are numerous modern examples which depict these heroic figures, who falls from supremacy because a private issue which go against their public image leak out causing people to question their title as hero.


Along with the problem of not knowing who these heroes truly are, we also not need another hero is because today people are not trying to just achieve goals in order to be virtuous, rather they are idealizing the people who have already achieved their goals. People should try and become virtuous by living a life they desire, not trying to mimic a life of another person.

Some of the questions which we would pose to the supporters of a hero are if you do say we need another hero, who should it be? And what criteria does it take in order to become a hero? Also wouldn’t society benefit from basing what a virtuous person consist of on a larger percentage of the population rather then this small percentage which makes up the heroes, or so called virtuous people of today?

Different Conceptions of Justice

Macintyre’s “Justice as a Virtue: Changing Conceptions,” explores how there are different senses of the concept of justice. He adeptly demonstrates how justice can be viewed in different forms through a modern example of aspects in United States political systems. Macintyre further illustrates two relatable viewpoints in the forms of “A” and “B,” where “A” believes that he has legitimately acquired his property and wealth. On the contrary, “B” holds that there is injustice with the distribution of wealth; the needy should be given assistance solely because they need it.

With the example of “A” and “B” directly opposing views of the just and unjust, Macintyre exhibits how the two views of the just can come to a compromise if both views are addressed if and only if the limits of each view are not breeched by the other. However, further into the reading, Macintyre concludes that both views are “incommensurable” and ultimately only one can be implemented at the expense of the other. “For A aspires to ground the notion of justice in some account of what…a person is entitled to in virtue of what he has acquired…B aspires to ground the notion of justice in some account of the equality of…each person in respect of basic needs…But our pluralist culture possess no method of weighing…Thus these two types of claims are indeed incommensurable” (Macintyre 246). Macintyre demonstrates how in light of different notions of justice, one concept of justice will always prevail over the other. In order to resolve one concept of what is just, the other concept must be “sacrificed.” The incommensurable nature of “A” and “B” claims leads to a dilemma of ultimate justice.

As justice is seen in everyday life, controversies arise out of peoples’ different views of justice and what they deem is just and unjust. In light of Macintyre’s point of how the latter claims cannot ultimately be solved equally, my question is how does anybody’s issue with what is just or idea of justice get addressed? How can anyone’s definition of justice be accurate if one claim of justice always leads to injustice in the eyes of another? If each definition of what is considered as justice overlaps another idea of justice, how is true justice ever reached and how do we know that it is just?

Perhaps Macintyre would simply address these concerns with the notion that people perceive justice or what is just through what they have seen to be known as justice. He may argue that people judge the just through preconceived notions and what they know society accepts as the just.

Aristotle's Friendship: Modern or Ancient

Macintyre’s After Virtue a Story of Moral Theory studies past understandings of moral questions. As you might expect his chapter, titled “Aristotle’s Account of the Virtues” is his explanation of Aristotle’s discussion of virtue in the Greek city-states and polis. Macintyre works his way through both of Aristotle’s major ethics based works and sets up his argument as a way to explain how this ancient work applies to the modern, social world.

Eventually, Macintyre’s explanations lead him to discuss his understanding of Aristotle’s description of friendship. Aristotle defines friendship through three distinctions. First, there is a friendship of utility; this type of friendship is based on a mutual need for one another. Aristotle’s second distinction is a friendship of pleasure, which is based on the mutual ability to provide pleasure for one another. Finally, a genuine friendship is one of mutual bond in which both people form a bond based on giving to each other.

For Aristotle, friendship is based a “common allegiance to and a common pursuit of goals” (Account 156). This explains Aristotle’s distinction that the best polis is based upon a friendship among all the citizens as a way to eventually work towards a common good. However, Macintyre makes the distinction that for the modern person it is expected that affection has taken the primary role in friendship rather than pursuit of a common good. In this sense, friendship has changed significantly from “a type of social and political relationship” to “an emotional state” involving two people rather than the pursuit of a large group (Account 156).

Macintyre comments that it is likely Aristotle would look at this modern definition of friendship would lead to a society of people who are detached from their country or ruling body. This model of friendship, in Aristotle’s mind, can only be a friendship of mutual advantage. When Macintyre begins to discuss Aristotle’s point of view, he begins with statement explaining that Aristotle has a very simple and unified view of the complexities of human good, which is his attempt to discount Aristotle’s understanding of friendship and the city-state (Account 157). With his discussion, I believe that Macintyre shows a completely different understanding of what human life is because of his different time. This different understanding shows that in terms of explaining friendship based on striving for a mutual good it is tough for the modern human to understand how the common good of a country or city-state would relate to the common good of an individual friendship. So in these terms, is it possible that Aristotle’s understanding of friendship has become irrelevant in the modern world? Or for an individual relationship does Aristotle’s explanations of friendship still hold?

Voluntarily Suffering Injustice?

According to Aristotle in Book V, there are two parts of the politically just. One being natural in that it is universally valid everywhere and the other legal, it involves having people to lay down the rules regarding whether it is just or unjust, an act of justice or an act of injustice.
The difference between something that is just or unjust and an act of justice or injustice is that a just or unjust is a particular wrong or right but when the just or unjust is committed, it becomes an act of justice or act of injustice. As Aristotle states, “unjust is unjust by nature or enactment; when this has been done, it is an act of injustice, but before it is done it is only unjust (N.E. 78).”
To determine whether an act is just or if it is an act of injustice, it depends on if the act was committed voluntarily or involuntarily. For example, if someone were to take your hand and force you to hit another person, hitting another person is an unjust act, but because it was done by force on you to the victim, your act is an error since you did not choose to hit the victim. Other factors to take into consideration are whether the unjust act was carefully thought out or done in ignorance. If person A taunts person B in a public place and person B, out of anger, hits person A without considering the consequences of getting arrested. Although person B committed an illegal unjust act, person B is not unjust because person B did not attack person A out of a personal wicked intention. An example for ignorance, person A without realizing, closes the door on person B’s hand. Out of ignorance, person A had closed the door when person B’s hand was still there. Closing the door on person B’s hand is an unjust act, but person A is not unjust because it was an accident.
Aristotle defines the term “injustice” to mean “harming with knowledge of the victim, the instrument, and the way, against the wish of the victim (N.E. 81),” and that “suffering injustice is not voluntary (N.E. 81).” Recently on the news, a professor from the University of Alabama shot at six of her co-workers and killed three of them. Shooting six of her coworkers is an act of injustice, which also makes the professor unjust, and it is universally known to everyone in the United States that intentionally shooting someone, the shooter will be automatically be sent to jail. Wouldn’t the professor already know that her action would send her to jail? Wouldn’t she know that being sent to jail would not only waste her life, but it would ruin her reputation and harm her forever? Wouldn’t this professor be inflicting injustice not only onto her co-workers but also onto herself? Isn’t the professor, in order to see her colleagues harmed, willing to suffer the injustice?
However, in chapter 11, when Aristotle addresses suicide, he states that because the individual kills himself willingly, it is not an injustice to himself, but an injustice to the city (N.E. 84). So, Aristotle would probably respond to my example with, even though no one wants to go to jail, the professor, in order to see her coworkers harmed, was indirectly willing to go to jail, and so it is not an injustice to herself.

We Are Greater than Our Proportions

Book V of Nicomachean Ethics is devoted to discussions of justice: in law, in virtue, and in exchange, to name a few. Aristotle discusses justice from the descriptive perspective; he is not attempting to provide universal rules or metaethical principles governing justice, instead he is merely seeking to provide a general overview of how justice is incorporated into the ethics of peoples and of society.

In relation to law, Aristotle describes those who act in accordance with justice as just and those who do not as unjust. He states that justice in regard to law is relative to society: “The lawful person is just…[because, since] laws aim either at the common benefit of all, or at the benefit of those in control… in one way what we call just is whatever produces and maintains happiness and its parts for a political community” (Nicomachean 68). For Aristotle, virtue, in general, is also relative to society; therefore, if being just and being virtuous are both defined by being in accordance with society, then since justice of law is of accordance with society, those just in law must be virtuous, in general. On the other hand, justice can be a subset of virtue, “there is another type of injustice [and justice]…special injustice [and justice, which] is concerned with honor or wealth or safety, and aims at the pleasure that results from making a profit, whereas the concern of injustice as a whole is whatever concerns the excellent person [or virtuous person, as above]” (70).

Aristotle describes other aspects of justice in terms of this subset of virtue; he proposes that the “mean,” “excellent” state of justice is that in accordance with proper distributions of “good” and “evil” between other parties and oneself to the effect that each person’s gain or loss is equivalent. But, equivalent does not necessarily mean equal in number, it merely means equal in proportion [geometric or numerical]. This proportion is supposed to compensate for the fact that there are more variables than those in question which determine the equivalence of a transaction or interaction. For instance, a builder and a shoemaker may engage in a “just” exchange even though the builder may supply only 1 house for a far more numerous (or perhaps plentiful) number of shoes; this transaction can still be just because although the quantities of the good are not equal they are equivalent, because each shoe is worth proportionately less than each house.

Many of these just distribution descriptions seem to be reasonable and applicable to the modern-day, although some seem like an out-dated basic economic textbook—by about two-thousand years; Aristotle even briefly suggests theories of currency, monetary policy, and marginal utility. But his argument of proportionality does seem a bit too simple to be practical, particularly when dealing with non-zero-sum games. Most of the examples he provides deal with zero-sum games, where 1+1=2; therefore he only has to worry about distributing a fixed amount between two people, weighted based on each of their other qualities, etc. But in the real world, many games are non-zero-sum, for instance 1+1=5; two workers can together produce more than simply the sum of their individual quantities if they were alone. This makes the concept of just distributions much more difficult to discern because even if one can figure out the correct proportions of each agents worth, if the distribution is not tilted more than their respective proportion, one of the agents or workers may not want to cooperate, thereby potentially losing more than the 1 unit for the remaining worker than they could have produce on their own.