In Book 3: Chapter 7, Aristotle states, “whoever stands firm against the right things and fears the right things, for the right end, in the right way, at the right time, and is correspondingly confident, is the brave person” (41). This statement is full of definitive statements in reference to his idea of what it means to be brave; however, this definition seems too vague and leaves many questions unanswered. For example, to “stand against the right thing”, according to Aristotle, concerns standing in the face of death, which, in my opinion, is foolish. Certainly, an incompetent, unconfident, ignoramus would be able to stand in front of whatever he wanted, including death, with maybe even a reason that he, himself, considers “right”, and would not be regarded as brave by any standards. I believe that it is not the act of facing death that makes one brave (because then all brave people would be dead), but instead, I’d consider braveness to be the ability to have hope and act in accordance with survival methods in a seemingly hopeless situation, and not to face death as an equal (for surely death always wins) but to have the goal of surmounting the possibility of it. I also hold bravery as a very idealistic concept, as I believe that a great majority of people are afraid of the unknown, and death is certainly one of those unknown entities of which people will be afraid of once it becomes a reality; making true courage (in Aristotle’s sense of the term) completely obsolete.
One aspect of general ancient Greek philosophy that we had mentioned in class was the fact that the Greeks, including Aristotle, were not concerned with the intentions of people’s actions, but merely the end of the action itself.
Indeed, Aristotle points out that the courageous “activity [must] aim at [the] actions in accord with the state of character” (41) in order to be perceived as virtuous and right; however, this idea is directly contrary to my learned presupposition that Aristotle was not concerned with the intentions or emotions behind people’s actions. To impose that one’s internal, emotionally-related state of character is significant to the notion of brave actions seemed contradictory.
Another contradiction that arose was the fact that in Book 3, Chapter 8, Aristotle writes, “bravery…is caused by shame and by desire for something fine, namely honor” (43). According to this, an avoidance of shame shapes reasoning behind a brave person’s acts, as does a desire for honor. There is certainly nothing brave about doing an action by means of merely avoiding shame, nor is there anything honorable about such an act. Also, to do an action in a pursuit of a “desire for honor” goes completely against prior statements Aristotle mentioned about virtuous actions being virtuous only insofar as they are they, themselves, an end, and not the means to an end. For one to take part in a brave action while holding the idea that it will lead him to honor, is certainly not brave, but simply egotistical.
Subscribe to:
Post Comments (Atom)
4 comments:
The "state of character" argument does seem to conflict with the preference of ancient Greek philosophy to value results over intent, but perhaps that is because the former is mentioned in the specific context of virtue, whereas the latter is generally mentioned in the broad context of happiness. Virtue is only one of many subsets toward achieving Aristotle's all-important happiness.
Also, it may be possible that we are merely mincing words; perhaps the Greeks did in fact consider "intent," but using their definition, not ours. If this is the case, it may explain why Aristotle seems to use intent as a disqualifier, rather than as a qualifier--as we frequently do today.
For instance, Aristotle uses the "state" or intent argument to disqualify a soldier who holds steadfast in battle due to compulsion from their commander, from being [automatically] considered virtously brave: "The brave person [in contrast to the soldier]...must be moved by the fine, not by compulsion" (Nicomachean Ethics 43.8.4). An example from today however would probably use intent in terms of qualification--e.g., a breaker of the law is qualified as inoccent because they did not intend to do wrong (because of non-willfull ignorance, etc).
Any thoughts?
Regards,
Martin
[2 of 6]
I believe that you are absolutely correct that in today’s context death as a form of bravery can be considered as completely irrelevant to our subjective or individualistic way of thinking. However, although death as a form of bravery is not the most idealistic way of thinking in our modern era, I believe that we must interpret the aforementioned passages in the context of Aristotle’s era. In fact, Aristotle doesn’t say that in order to be a “brave” person, the person must die; he does say, though, that a “brave” person is one that is willing to face, “the immediate dangers that initiate death.” Therefore, in this respect I think that it can be agreed that in everything we do we face danger. If a person drives a car or takes a trip on an airplane, that person is “brave” because there is always a chance of death in every risk that is taken in everyday life.
Also, Aristotle’s statements must be taken in the context of his era; his words may not always be taken in the context of our modern day of thinking. Ancient Greece was a war-like society and of a competitive nature; therefore, they constantly faced death and were “training” their youth to be “brave.” As Aristotle said: bravery comes with experience and they are teaching their youth to be able to take risks in order to make their society “better” and increasingly competitive with other city-states.
I agree with you about Aristotle explaining his opinions concerning bravery in correlation to his own context of living in Ancient Greece – I may have put too much emphasis on Aristotle’s mention of death in its relation to bravery; however, I would have to disagree with your notion in regards to our being brave when facing events in our everyday lives such as (“driv[ing] a car or tak[ing] a trip on an airplane. I’d suggest that Aristotle did not meant this when philosophically investigating the concept of bravery, in that I did not take it to relate to anything quite so “daily” in the life of the average person. Aristotle states that “bravery…is caused by shame and my desire for something fine, namely honor” (43). I would not consider everyday actions that most people would likely refer to as mundane to be bravery in the way Aristotle had meant it, as no honor is achieved from most actions that would be considered to be “everyday”.
I do see your point in saying that Aristotle’s definitive statements used to define bravery are ambiguous at best. However, perhaps ambiguity is best, as virtue is not only determined by the individual but by society as well. Perhaps during his own time period bravery meant something different. He is, after all, describing a general character of bravery. While our objective views on what actually defines bravery are undoubtedly different, some of what Aristotle describes can be seen in our own post-Christian ethics. Doing what is right is a universal term for what the society deems as right. While for Aristotle doing right is prompted by the avoidance of shame and the acquiescence of honor, for us it may be as you defined it. The fact is, doing what is right is virtuous, despite our definition and in this Aristotle is constant.
Post a Comment