Voluntarily Suffering Injustice?

According to Aristotle in Book V, there are two parts of the politically just. One being natural in that it is universally valid everywhere and the other legal, it involves having people to lay down the rules regarding whether it is just or unjust, an act of justice or an act of injustice.
The difference between something that is just or unjust and an act of justice or injustice is that a just or unjust is a particular wrong or right but when the just or unjust is committed, it becomes an act of justice or act of injustice. As Aristotle states, “unjust is unjust by nature or enactment; when this has been done, it is an act of injustice, but before it is done it is only unjust (N.E. 78).”
To determine whether an act is just or if it is an act of injustice, it depends on if the act was committed voluntarily or involuntarily. For example, if someone were to take your hand and force you to hit another person, hitting another person is an unjust act, but because it was done by force on you to the victim, your act is an error since you did not choose to hit the victim. Other factors to take into consideration are whether the unjust act was carefully thought out or done in ignorance. If person A taunts person B in a public place and person B, out of anger, hits person A without considering the consequences of getting arrested. Although person B committed an illegal unjust act, person B is not unjust because person B did not attack person A out of a personal wicked intention. An example for ignorance, person A without realizing, closes the door on person B’s hand. Out of ignorance, person A had closed the door when person B’s hand was still there. Closing the door on person B’s hand is an unjust act, but person A is not unjust because it was an accident.
Aristotle defines the term “injustice” to mean “harming with knowledge of the victim, the instrument, and the way, against the wish of the victim (N.E. 81),” and that “suffering injustice is not voluntary (N.E. 81).” Recently on the news, a professor from the University of Alabama shot at six of her co-workers and killed three of them. Shooting six of her coworkers is an act of injustice, which also makes the professor unjust, and it is universally known to everyone in the United States that intentionally shooting someone, the shooter will be automatically be sent to jail. Wouldn’t the professor already know that her action would send her to jail? Wouldn’t she know that being sent to jail would not only waste her life, but it would ruin her reputation and harm her forever? Wouldn’t this professor be inflicting injustice not only onto her co-workers but also onto herself? Isn’t the professor, in order to see her colleagues harmed, willing to suffer the injustice?
However, in chapter 11, when Aristotle addresses suicide, he states that because the individual kills himself willingly, it is not an injustice to himself, but an injustice to the city (N.E. 84). So, Aristotle would probably respond to my example with, even though no one wants to go to jail, the professor, in order to see her coworkers harmed, was indirectly willing to go to jail, and so it is not an injustice to herself.

We Are Greater than Our Proportions

Book V of Nicomachean Ethics is devoted to discussions of justice: in law, in virtue, and in exchange, to name a few. Aristotle discusses justice from the descriptive perspective; he is not attempting to provide universal rules or metaethical principles governing justice, instead he is merely seeking to provide a general overview of how justice is incorporated into the ethics of peoples and of society.

In relation to law, Aristotle describes those who act in accordance with justice as just and those who do not as unjust. He states that justice in regard to law is relative to society: “The lawful person is just…[because, since] laws aim either at the common benefit of all, or at the benefit of those in control… in one way what we call just is whatever produces and maintains happiness and its parts for a political community” (Nicomachean 68). For Aristotle, virtue, in general, is also relative to society; therefore, if being just and being virtuous are both defined by being in accordance with society, then since justice of law is of accordance with society, those just in law must be virtuous, in general. On the other hand, justice can be a subset of virtue, “there is another type of injustice [and justice]…special injustice [and justice, which] is concerned with honor or wealth or safety, and aims at the pleasure that results from making a profit, whereas the concern of injustice as a whole is whatever concerns the excellent person [or virtuous person, as above]” (70).

Aristotle describes other aspects of justice in terms of this subset of virtue; he proposes that the “mean,” “excellent” state of justice is that in accordance with proper distributions of “good” and “evil” between other parties and oneself to the effect that each person’s gain or loss is equivalent. But, equivalent does not necessarily mean equal in number, it merely means equal in proportion [geometric or numerical]. This proportion is supposed to compensate for the fact that there are more variables than those in question which determine the equivalence of a transaction or interaction. For instance, a builder and a shoemaker may engage in a “just” exchange even though the builder may supply only 1 house for a far more numerous (or perhaps plentiful) number of shoes; this transaction can still be just because although the quantities of the good are not equal they are equivalent, because each shoe is worth proportionately less than each house.

Many of these just distribution descriptions seem to be reasonable and applicable to the modern-day, although some seem like an out-dated basic economic textbook—by about two-thousand years; Aristotle even briefly suggests theories of currency, monetary policy, and marginal utility. But his argument of proportionality does seem a bit too simple to be practical, particularly when dealing with non-zero-sum games. Most of the examples he provides deal with zero-sum games, where 1+1=2; therefore he only has to worry about distributing a fixed amount between two people, weighted based on each of their other qualities, etc. But in the real world, many games are non-zero-sum, for instance 1+1=5; two workers can together produce more than simply the sum of their individual quantities if they were alone. This makes the concept of just distributions much more difficult to discern because even if one can figure out the correct proportions of each agents worth, if the distribution is not tilted more than their respective proportion, one of the agents or workers may not want to cooperate, thereby potentially losing more than the 1 unit for the remaining worker than they could have produce on their own.

Friendships and Justice

For Aristotle, friendship follows the concept of a mutual and fair exchange. All people, virtuous and not, enter these relationships with other people for a loving exchange in which each person betters themselves because of the other. These relationships can be broken down into three types. The first is a friendship of utility in which both parties gain something for their own use. For example, a wealthy man with few friends becomes friends with a poor man with many friends. The wealthy man gets to meet new people and the poor man partakes in lavish goods. Both use each other for their own benefit. The second type is a friendship of pleasure where two people are pleasant to each other. For example two people who simply enjoy each other’s company become friends because it is pleasurable for each of them respectively to do so. The final type is a complete friendship which is when two good virtuous people develop a friendship over a long period of time in which they wish good onto to each other for the opposite party’s sake. Aristotle focuses on how friendships are very common but the only ones that will endure are friendships based on virtue and mutual good-giving, while the other ones will dissolve away quickly.

Throughout Book VIII, Aristotle also draws many comparisons between friendship and justice which gives insight into how a properly run communities and political systems work. The basis of this comparison comes from Aristotle’s view that if people of different social worth become friends the one of lesser worth must love the other more then he/she loves them. This is why a kingship is the supreme political setup, because a good king shows some form of love to his subjects and they should return this love in multiples in form of obedience and order to their king. Furthermore if the king’s subjects are friends with each other they are more likely to be just to each which keeps peace in society.

However, I believe Aristotle’s view of friendships between unequals is quite dated and not relevant to society today. Aristotle says the following about the relationship of quantity of love to the caliber of person, “the better person, and the more beneficial and each of the other likewise, must be loved more than he loves” (Ethics 127). In other words, the inferior person must love the superior more than the superior does to the inferior in order to achieve equality. In a society it is vital to use each person to better the society as a whole and if people are focused on doing goods and loving their superior then there is less attention on doing good and helping the inferior and lower members of society.

Perhaps, Aristotle would say that when we do good for others in friendships, we are actually doing for the sake of our selves and thus this would be helping the inferiors to improve.

Different views about pleasure

The beginning parts of Book X of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics involves whether or not pleasure is the good. In chapters 2 and 3 of Book X, three different views are shown arguing if pleasure is the good. The first argument to emerge was from Eudoxus. He thought that, “pleasure is the good, because he saw that all [animals], both rational and non-rational, seek it.” (Page 154) What Eudoxus is saying is that animals with or without reason strive for good. Obviously, both rational and non-rational animals seek different pleasures but he also said that they were similar because, “what all aim at, is the good.” (Page 154)
Eudoxus says that pain, “is something to be avoided for all, so that, similarly, its contrary is choice worthy for all.” (Page 154) In other words, pleasure should be sought by everyone, while pain needs to be avoided. However, isn’t it harmful for an individual to avoid pain? However, Eudoxus thoughts of pleasure being the good come into question by Plato. Plato believes that pleasure is a good; however, it is one of the many other goods.
Plato disagrees with Eudoxus notion that good added with another type of good makes a good more desirable. “Plato uses this sort of argument to undermine the claim of pleasure to be the good. For he argues, the pleasant life is more choice worthy when combined with prudence than it is without it; and if the mixed [good] is better, pleasure is not the good, since nothing can be added to the good to make it more choice worthy.” (Page 155)
Aristotle agrees with Plato about pleasure being a good, but not the good. Aristotle argues against their views that pleasure is not a quality, is indefinite and is a process. Aristotle argues against their beliefs by saying that pleasure is not a process. I question Aristotle when he says that pleasure is not a process. How doesn’t pleasure require a process? Don’t a few steps need to be taken in order to achieve pleasure? I think Aristotle answers my question by saying that, “For every process, such as constructing a building, takes time, and aims at some end, and is complete when it produces the product it seeks.” (Page 157)

The one sided view of Bravery and Temperance

The second half of Book III of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics takes a deeper look at two individual virtues. Chapters 6-9 deal with bravery and chapter’s 10-12 focus on temperance. He explains what both bravery and temperance consist of and gives examples of the opposite of bravery and temperance; cowardness and intemperance. He gives his thought on what bravery and temperance is along with what they are not in order to eliminate some of the common misconceptions people may have.

Aristotle defines bravery as a “mean about what inspires confidence and about what is frightening in the conditions we have described; it chooses and stands firm because that is fine or because anything else is shameful” (Ethics 42). This is stating that a brave man is someone who is confident in the situation he is in and will deal with what is at hand and will not turn away from this fear. However, theses fears may be different for individual people, so in order to solidify his stance on what makes up a brave person Aristotle says that someone is “fully brave if he is intrepid in facing a fine death, and the immediate dangers that bring death” (Ethics 41). This is an interesting point that leads to what I think is a potential contradiction. In the definition of bravery he says the man must be confident about what he is fearful of and then he says being fully brave is someone who will not back away from death. From his words here he believes a soldier to have true bravery. His idea is flawed because what if a soldier is not fearful of death or the dangers of the war and is willing to give his life up in order to protect his people? Is he not exemplifying true bravery even though he is not fearful of death?

I think Aristotle would try and take my question and try to place it into one of his conditions that resemble bravery. He would try and see what are the reasons behind wanting to fight in the war, what is the end. He would try and see if I was seeking any honorable gain, he would say this is not true bravery but bravery of citizens. If I did not fit into the first condition he would try to see what other conditions from Book III chapter 8 I fit into.

After talking about bravery Aristotle begins to discuss temperance. He defines temperance as “a mean concerned with pleasures” (45). He then says intemperance people have no control and overindulged in everything. He then says a temperate person “finds no pleasure in what most pleases the intemperate person" (48). Questions then arise out of these statements of whether or not a temperate person can become intemperate or vice versa. What if there is someone who is a health freak and watches everything he has eaten for years decides to eat ice cream for every meal for the next 6 months, is he still considered a temperate person?

Aristotle would say he is not a temperate person in the 6 months he is eating all of this ice cream because he is not observing moderation and is therefore intemperate. However, he may still be a temperate person if he decides after six months to only have ice cream in moderation. He can still be a temperate person even though he feasted on ice cream for 6 months because even though he overindulged he still refrained after the 6 months and that shows he did not give into his pleasures and was able to observe moderation.

The Relationship Between Pleasure and Happiness (and Aristotle Talking Smack at Me For Not Completely Understanding It)

Chapters 11-14 in Book VII of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics consider the idea of pleasure (acknowledging what other philosophers think of it, whether or not it is ultimately good or bad, its relationship to happiness, and the role it plays in the physical body). Book 13, specifically, contains one of Aristotle’s most important arguments, insisting that some pleasures play a productive role in happiness.

In Chapter 12, Aristotle concludes that pleasure is an activity. This observation allows him to compare the functions of pleasure and happiness (which he also considers to be an activity) in Chapter 13. In Chapter 13, Aristotle explains how the best good results from an uninhibited form of pleasure. Similarly, he points out that happiness is most choice worthy “if the activity is unimpeded” (Nicomachean 116). Aristotle concludes that the ideal existence is one with incessant happiness interwoven with the resulting incessant pleasure. Following the aforementioned claims, Aristotle warns his readers against the idea that happiness could result from a “fall into terrible misfortunes” (Nicomachean 117).

In response to Aristotle’s apparent disapproval of misfortune, I am inclined to argue that misfortune is, in fact, necessary in order to attain happiness. I think that without misfortune, happiness would have no way of being measured and/or appreciated. It seems to me that incessant happiness and pleasure would result in a form of ethical disorientation, no longer allowing people to put their own happiness/pleasure into perspective. For me, this ensuing disorientation would neither make me happy nor bring me pleasure.

Despite hearing my qualms with his argument in Chapter 13, I believe Aristotle would maintain his original understanding concerning pleasure and pain. I think Aristotle’s rebuttal to my criticisms would entail him pointing out the fact that I am a human and that my distaste for a static form of happiness stems from my creaturely/materialistic tendencies. I assume that Aristotle would, in his defense, quote Chapter 14, stating how “for just as it is the inferior human being who is prone to variation, so also the nature that needs variation is inferior, since it is not simple or decent” (Nicomachean 119).

While I may take slight objection to Aristotle calling me an “inferior human being”, I admit that my understanding of the value in a static form of pleasure and happiness is probably limited by my material/human mind. Maybe if I lead a slow and meditative lifestyle, similar to that of a Tibetan monk, I might be able to impress Aristotle.

Concerns, Questions, and Objections to various statements Aristotle uses to characteristically describe “Bravery”.

In Book 3: Chapter 7, Aristotle states, “whoever stands firm against the right things and fears the right things, for the right end, in the right way, at the right time, and is correspondingly confident, is the brave person” (41). This statement is full of definitive statements in reference to his idea of what it means to be brave; however, this definition seems too vague and leaves many questions unanswered. For example, to “stand against the right thing”, according to Aristotle, concerns standing in the face of death, which, in my opinion, is foolish. Certainly, an incompetent, unconfident, ignoramus would be able to stand in front of whatever he wanted, including death, with maybe even a reason that he, himself, considers “right”, and would not be regarded as brave by any standards. I believe that it is not the act of facing death that makes one brave (because then all brave people would be dead), but instead, I’d consider braveness to be the ability to have hope and act in accordance with survival methods in a seemingly hopeless situation, and not to face death as an equal (for surely death always wins) but to have the goal of surmounting the possibility of it. I also hold bravery as a very idealistic concept, as I believe that a great majority of people are afraid of the unknown, and death is certainly one of those unknown entities of which people will be afraid of once it becomes a reality; making true courage (in Aristotle’s sense of the term) completely obsolete.

One aspect of general ancient Greek philosophy that we had mentioned in class was the fact that the Greeks, including Aristotle, were not concerned with the intentions of people’s actions, but merely the end of the action itself.
Indeed, Aristotle points out that the courageous “activity [must] aim at [the] actions in accord with the state of character” (41) in order to be perceived as virtuous and right; however, this idea is directly contrary to my learned presupposition that Aristotle was not concerned with the intentions or emotions behind people’s actions. To impose that one’s internal, emotionally-related state of character is significant to the notion of brave actions seemed contradictory.

Another contradiction that arose was the fact that in Book 3, Chapter 8, Aristotle writes, “bravery…is caused by shame and by desire for something fine, namely honor” (43). According to this, an avoidance of shame shapes reasoning behind a brave person’s acts, as does a desire for honor. There is certainly nothing brave about doing an action by means of merely avoiding shame, nor is there anything honorable about such an act. Also, to do an action in a pursuit of a “desire for honor” goes completely against prior statements Aristotle mentioned about virtuous actions being virtuous only insofar as they are they, themselves, an end, and not the means to an end. For one to take part in a brave action while holding the idea that it will lead him to honor, is certainly not brave, but simply egotistical.