WAR IS WAR!!!!!

In War and Massacre, Thomas Nagel states that the most common moral issue raised by the handling of warfare is the problem of means and ends (W&M 52). This problem is formed when one goes through the dilemma in which one believes that by taking a certain measure, its gains will outweigh its costs, however because of one’s moral intuition, one then suspects that the initial plan should be abandoned(W&M 52). Take, for example, that by bombing a village where several terrorists were believed to be residing, while this action may prevent more disasters, the lives of hundreds of innocent bystanders will also be obliterated in the process. According to Nagel, this dilemma is produced by the two conflicting categories of moral reason, utilitarian and absolutist. Utilitarianism is concerned with what will occur and absolutism is concerned with one’s actions (W&M 52). The difference between utilitarianism and absolutism is in its choices for certain means or ends.
Concerned with one’s actions in warfare, Nagel argues that there are moral restrictions on which the rules of war are based. He points out that the two types of absolutist restrictions on the conduct of war are the legitimate target that hostility can be directed to and the level of hostility that can be used on the target (W&M 67). Given the attack of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Nagel argues that by attacking the civilian population who pose no threat at all, the United States is wrongfully directing their hostility to the enemy’s vulnerable area when their hostility should be directed instead at the enemy’s government and military forces (W&M 68). Also, by dropping two indiscriminate instruments of death, one is treating one’s enemy and the civilians with very little of the respect that all human beings deserve (W&M 68). To define the first absolutist restriction, Nagel distinguishes between the combatants and the non-combatants based on their immediate threat or harmfulness (W&M 69). He rules out women and children as non-combatants, including the unarmed men and the supporting personnel who only cater to the needs of the combatants (W&M 69). For the second absolutist restriction, Nagel extends the idea that atomic bombs and other cruel weapons like starvation, poisoning, infectious diseases or weapons that are designed to disfigure, maim, or torture people, should not be used because they do not attempt to discriminate in their effects between the combatant and the human being (W&M 70). Nagel concludes the absolutist restrictions with the idea that even if the conflict is not between two military armies or governments but instead, the entire nation, this does not justify either side to combat against every aspect of the other nation (W&M 71).
This thought reminded me of the present day war between terrorism and the Western World. It also called to mind of the recent major bombing of Moscow’s subway station by a seventeen year old widow looking to avenge for her terrorist husband. It turns out her situation is not unique in that there has been a new phenomenon of “Black Widows” or young women recruited by terrorist organizations to be sent off as human bombs to kill the Russian civilians. This method of “war” would be totally new to Nagel because women and, in this case, children are no longer considered only non-combatants. Nagel would also disapprove of this method of war because the terrorists are targeting the civilians, rather than directly at their true aim, modernization. But how does one combat modernization? However, one can also argue that the war between terrorism and the Western World is not the same kind of war that Nagel was referring to. Still, I would say that war is war and all warfare should involve the moral restrictions.

Alternative Routes to General Happiness

In this section of Method of Ethics, Sidgwick posses the idea that a Utilitarian can come up with a rule which leads to a more general happiness but this rule differs from the rules which follow “common sense.” The new rule which can lead to general happiness has both positive and negative differences. He says in order for this new rule to work, he must “estimate the force of certain disadvantages necessarily attendant upon such innovations” (476). Sidgwick says that since one’s own happiness is a part of the universal end, he must consider the effects this new rule may have on him as well as others closely related to him.
Many calculations are needed for the Utilitarian in order to see if it is a good idea to implement the new rule in favor of the generally accepted rule. He warns however, that many people who are the first to try and make a change fail and if they wait for the change to happen gradually it will be more welcomed by others. He also warns that if this new rule is established it may not be initially followed by everyone. Sidgwick says, it is “easier to weaken or destroy the restraining force that a moral rule, habitually and generally obeyed, has over men’s minds than to substitute for it a new restraining habit, not similarly sustained by tradition and custom” (477). He is emphasizing that it is much easier to possibly modify or completely dispel a rule, rather than create a new rule which conflicts with common sense. Along with the negative differences the new rule may bring, it will also bring positive differences as well, such as providing a more “stricter interpretation to the general duty of General Benevolence, where Common sense leaves it loose and indeterminate”(479). He is saying that whatever is right for him to do, he can recommend to another person to do the same thing because it is leading to a general universal happiness.
Sidgwick brings up the point that maybe the main issue does not circle around whether or not following Utilitarian ways leads to a more general happiness, than following common sense, but should exceptions be allowed to rules which both sides consider valid? This is an interesting point which I think changes his entire argument. Before he was arguing that there are instances in which Utilitarian’s create new rules, which differ from rules followed by common sense, and lead to a more general happiness. But now he is saying that maybe each side is arguing over making exceptions to the rules rather than implementing a new rule. The question I would pose is which would ultimately provide an easier route to establishing a more general happiness, creating a new rule or making exceptions to ones already established? I think Sidgwick would say that making exceptions or modifications would be an easier and more effective way of attaining a general happiness. I think he would say this because he stated it was much harder for everyone to buy into a newly implemented rule, rather than just conforming to the slight modifications to a rule. The exceptions would be a slight adjustment to the rules for which everyone would be able to follow. Another question arises is are the exceptions the same for everyone or do they change depending on the circumstances?

What makes you happiest?

For me personally being in my happiest state consists of the simplest of things life has to offer; cold coffee, dark chocolate and fast cars. But how Mill would classify such things is unbenounced to me. Nor do I find myself to really care because I feel it makes me happy and that’s all that should matter in the end.

In Mill’s chapter two of utilitarianism, he is quoted as saying “ it is better to be a human dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied, and if the pig and fool are of different opinions, it is because they only know one side of the question.”

I must say, the first time I read this the first thing that ran threw my mind was ‘what a pretentious jerk.’ Then after further dissection of the quotation I have come to understand it better, just not completely. In my opinion I believe that according to Mill, happiness is broken down; quantity versus quality and animal versus human and that the quality of happiness is valued greater over quality and human pleasures are greater then those of someone seeking animalistic pleasure.

Human please has a greater worth that that of animalistic because it requires a higher demand of our intellectual faculties. Therefore, if you were to compare watching TV over a Broadway production the person respecting human pleasure would rather watch a Broadway play because they are more cultured and appreciate the higher intellectual gain. If the person seeking pleasures derived from just TV, than they value the quantity of the pleasure over the content and quality. The result of watching TV is then to be considered animalist pleasures because they are not administering their intellectual capabilities. While I am not sold one hundred percent on Mill’s theory, I see the message that he is trying to get across, that the cliché ignorance is bliss may not always be the case. Furthermore, Mill’s theory does not always hold true in all instances. For example, there are some that find pleasure in simple food rather then that artfully prepared by a chef after experiencing both.

While I am not judging anyone who prefers animalistic pleasures over human or vice versa, I know now that Mill’s quote regarding humans and pigs is refereeing to the people who are best qualified to judge the quality of pleasure are the people who have been on both sides of the fence so to speak. That is because these people who are so highly qualified have experienced both the animal and human pleasures life has to offer and realize that human pleasures may contain more worth in regards to happiness as opposed to others.

Mill Just Wants Everyone to Get Along

In order for society to strive for the greater good as a whole, Mill points out that only well-developed humans can make this possible. The reason for this is that a well-developed human, that is containing a strong sense of morality according to Mill’s standards, has control of his emotions.. One who exercises a strong moral worth is one who only wants to promote happiness to all other to gain unity. Mill writes, “…the horror of crime is in an ordinarily well-brought up young person” (Mill 73). What he means here is that young, under-developed people will not understand how to feel united because they have not yet learned that this promotion of happiness to others, and therefore unity, is a part of our consciousness and a part of our nature. It is our duty to strive for happiness within and for others.

Mill also points out that this is our moral obligation. That is, the principle of utility, which is achieving the greatest amount happiness for the greatest amount of people, is necessary for moral decision making. In order to understand our moral obligation we must experience breaks in our mass of feeling. Mill writes, “…a mass of feeling which must be broken through in order to do what violates our standard of right,” must be necessary in our experience in order for us to understand what constitutes our ‘origin of conscience’ (Mill 75). He then points out at this constitutes our ultimate sanction. We should not be embarrassed of other people’s moral standards, only be conscientious of all people and their feelings, whether they conflict with ours or not. Essentially we must be tolerant of all people, no matter what, because in order for humankind to strive for the greater good, we must gain an objective stance on other people’s feelings.

When we finally recognize general happiness as the ethical standard, it will constitute the strength of the utilitarian morality (Mill 77). Only with this understanding will we understand the kind of equality which is necessary for mankind’s unity. Again, as I stated in my title, Mill just wants everyone to understand each other’s ultimate goal so that we can promote happiness and get along. I know your parents don’t like a certain neighbor but they should not do anything to ruin their reputation, but they should understand that they are working for happiness in their individual way and should promote it if anything. Don’t get me wrong, I would get mad too if their dog was crapping in my yard but would you kill the dog, or just put up a fence?

Justice and Utility

Mill believes that utilitarianism to become a real way of life it is necessary to define justice within this main idea. Therefore, Mill begins to define justice first through defining what is unjust. He defines the unjust actions through five different main ideas, it is unjust to: deprive someone of their legal rights, depriving someone of something they have a moral right to possess, obtaining something that they do not morally deserve, violating an agreement with someone else, and showing favoritism to someone under inappropriate circumstances (Mill 44-45). Mill defines injustice to allow us to understand justice better.

After explaining what is unjust, Mill follows the idea of justice through history. By speaking of how each of the different ancient cultures understood justice, Mill believes that he will eventually reach what the definition of justice is. The groups most examined by Mill are the Greeks and Romans. These ancient peoples eventually recognized that although their idea of justice was simply following the law that because, “their laws had been made originally, and continued to be made, by men,” it was entirely possible that there were bad laws that had been made (47). Because of these bad laws it may become necessary to break them in certain situations. This idea of justice was also followed by Mill through Christianity; one of Christian’s main sources of law comes from the Ten Commandments which explicitly states that one should not lie. However, going back to a situation Kant used, if a life is endanger through the utilitarian idea of finding the greatest good for the whole community one should at least mislead the person because it is important to keep the good of all people in mind, because to keep a life will most likely help a community more than losing a life.

Through his examination of past cultures, Mill comes to the conclusion that the justice in its lowest form is following the law and being punished for breaking those laws. However, as he continues to write, Mill decides that justice is different for each and every person because the definition of utility for each person changes. In the end, justice seemingly coincides with the idea that every person being an individual must simply hope that they can work for the same ultimate goal of a communal happiness which would allow for justice to be found within the entire community.

Mill’s understanding of justice is so drastically different from both Kant and Aristotle, is it possible that each person must find their own, individual definition of justice, but that this definition must be in harmony with others in the community? Or do Kant and Aristotle’s definitions work better because they allow for a more rigid understanding thereby allowing everyone to have the same definition? In the end, I believe that each individual should find his or her own definition but still have a clear idea of justice in society also.

Mill's Defense of the Doctrine of Utilitarianism & its Relationship to Virtue

In J.S. Mill’s Utilitarianism, Mill alleges in Chapter IV “Of What Sort of Proof the Principle of Utility is Susceptible” that the first principles are not capable of proof by reasoning. He reiterates this basis initially introduced in Chapter II, but goes a step further in his explanation of the utilitarian doctrine as “that happiness is desirable, and that the only thing desirable, as an end; all other things being only desirable as means to that end” (Mill 35). The remainder of his argument arguably justifies this statement. Because we cannot ascertain this principle through reason, Mill argues that we know it through experience. Mill maintains the position that “No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness” (Mill 35). At first, this appears to be a very immature and unfounded argument (“I’m right because I know I’m right”) that does little to address objections to the doctrine of utility. But upon further investigation, Mill proves that the desire of things other than happiness can be decidedly distinguished from the sole desire of happiness. Mill explains that “Happiness is not an abstract idea but a concrete whole” consisting of many separate parts (Mill 38). These parts range from the love of music or the desire for health to the love of money. According to the utilitarian doctrine, virtue is not a universal but it is just as authentic as the desire for happiness. So for those who desire virtue, they do so not as “a means to happiness, but as a part of their happiness” (Mill 37). Therefore, virtue seems almost as an optional component to happiness. Unlike Aristotle, Mill does not believe that the perfection of a virtuous character will lead to the ultimate end of happiness. He acquiesces that although it may be a part of one’s happiness, the desire for the attainment of virtue is not a road map to happiness.
Returning to Mill’s initial question about what sort of proof this principle is susceptible to, he answers that “if human nature is so constituted as to desire nothing which is not either a part of happiness or a means of happiness – we can have no other proof, and we require no other, that these are the only things desirable” (Mill 39). Mill argues that since all human beings desire the same thing – happiness (whether directly or indirectly, in some way or another) than there can exist no opposition to this argument and he does not require a proof to prove his point. Is this true? Do we truly need no logical or rational proof to justify the pursuit of happiness? Also, how can virtue be optional to happiness according to the doctrine of utilitarianism, if this same doctrine requires one to promote the greatest happiness of others? Can one help promote another’s happiness without a virtuous character? Or does the pursuit of a virtuous character (according to Aristotle or other philosophers) obstruct or blur the achievement of happiness?

"Reasons We Can Share"

Philosophers have defined primal morality as an act done for or to someone else. Christine Korsgaard argues that morality revolves around people doing something together. “The subject of morality is not what we should bring about, but how we relate to one another” (Korsgaard 275). The question is whether reasons and values are subjective, existing only in relation to individuals, or objective, there for everyone?

Subjective reasons are actions done for one self, for example, promoting your own happiness. Subjective reasons are declared “good-for”. Objective reasons are actions done for anyone, for example, promoting the happiness of yourself and some one else. This is considered “good-absolutely”. There is a second interpretation of “good-absolutely” that has an intrinsic value, meaning that it provides a reason for both people to act for one another.

In “Reasons We Can Share” Korsgaard makes the claim that reasons and values are objective. She argues against Thomas Nagel who believes reasons and values are subjective. Nagel posits that all subjective reasons must be taken in order to have objective correlates. “If it is good for me to have something, then we must regard it as good-absolutely that I should have it” (Nagel 277). To counter this argument Korsgaard gives the example of someone being bullied. According to Nagel’s argument the person who is being bullied resents the action and because he resents it then the bully should as well. But Korsgaard argues that the person who is being a bully should know not to bully people because he would not like it done to him. Korsgaard applies relational concepts (objective) while Nagel proposes individual concepts (subjective). Nagel says that in order for us to relate with other people we must find an understanding in ourselves while Korsgaard says that we can act morally to other people because we know they exist.

Nagel re-claims his statement and states that some actions are purely subjective neutral and that objective reasons are not necessary in these actions. Nagel gives the example of climbing a mountain; stating that the action of climbing will only bring happiness to one person. Korsgaard counters his argument by stating that Nagel’s example can be defined as an ambition. Furthermore, ambitions are put in place because people have already put an objective realist interpretation. She gives the example of viewing a painting or eating chocolate. Someone who eats chocolate likes it and someone who does not can potentially be missing out on some sort of value. But these values where already put in place by the masses not by an individual, thus stating that individuals react in an objective manner rather than subjective.

Korsgaard main point; “to say you have a reason is to say something relational, something which implies the existence of another, at least another self” (Korsgaard 301).
Moreover, normative claims are claims that we make on ourselves and with each other. Thus, Korsgaard disproves Nagel by claiming that acknowledging another person is not a reason to treat someone in a certain way but “rather something that stands behind the very possibility of reasons” (Korsgaard 301).

I agree that can not exert claims on others without realizing that other people exist. I also agree that the world is a relational and interdependent place. One can not exist by him or herself. I feel that Korsgaard’s point has human character taken into account while Nagel’s point claims that individuals act out of purely individualistic which is not a reality.